As of May 11, 2023 there is no public record of an Ural Airlines A320 making a forced field landing. That said, Ural has a high profile in Russian media after the 2019 Ural A321 cornfield forced landing following a bird strike, and that event is a useful operational touchstone when thinking about a hydraulic-related diversion or off‑field landing scenario.

From a pilot point of view the A320 family is built around three independent hydraulic circuits commonly called Green, Yellow and Blue. Those circuits provide redundant power to the landing gear, brakes, nose wheel steering and primary flight controls. The Green and Yellow systems are normally engine driven while the Blue system is electrically powered and may be supported by the Ram Air Turbine in extreme emergencies. Understanding which system powers which function matters because the loss of a single circuit can change what landing options remain viable.

Operationally the Green circuit is the one to watch for runways and field work. On typical A320-type installations Green supplies normal brakes and in many configurations the nose wheel steering system. If Green pressure is lost crews can still get braking from the Yellow system or from the brake accumulator in the alternate mode, but stopping performance will be degraded and nose wheel steering may be unavailable. The immediate operational effect is longer landing distance and degraded directional control on rollout, which is exactly why crews sometimes prefer a longer runway even when one closer appears usable.

How this plays out in flight planning is familiar to anyone who has flown long sectors under ETOPS rules. ETOPS principles are, at their core, risk management for extended diversions and for time limited systems. Regulators require that operators plan routes with adequate alternates and fuel to accommodate likely diversions and to ensure time limited systems remain capable for the planned maximum diversion time. That same mindset is useful on domestic or continental sectors where a hydraulic fault effectively extends the aircrafts landing-distance or reduces available braking. If an operator treats a major hydraulic loss like a time limited system failure, preflight and dispatch decisions will naturally bias toward alternates with longer runways and full rescue and fire fighting services.

From a practical in‑flight standpoint here are the critical considerations and actions I would expect from crews and dispatch when a Green hydraulic fault occurs or is suspected:

  • Manage the immediate checklist and ECAM items. Confirm which indications are present, the state of reservoir quantities and which pumps are available. The ECAM will identify the affected circuit and suggest memory items and procedures.

  • Declare the nature of the emergency early if the failure affects braking or steering. That gets the receiving airport to prepare and opens the door to priority handling and extra services. It also protects the crew and operator legally when fuel states force a nonstandard diversion.

  • Reassess landing performance with conservative assumptions. If nose wheel steering is lost or normal braking degraded, landing distance required increases. Choose the longest available suitable runway that the aircraft can reach safely given current fuel and weather. On some aircraft the PTU may come online and provide partial assistance but it is not a substitute for planning a longer landing roll.

  • Monitor fuel carefully. A hydraulic defect that leaves gear doors ajar or that prevents gear doors from closing can impose a noticeable drag penalty and raise trip fuel burn. Crews must factor any abnormal drag or leak into diversion fuel calculations and be prepared to accept a closer field rather than continue to an intended alternate if fuel state deteriorates. Using the nearest suitable runway often beats chasing a preferred destination when margins shrink.

  • Be prepared for alternate gear extension and degraded braking techniques. The A320 has manual or alternate gear extension methods and the brake accumulator is designed to supply a limited number of full brake applications in the event of multiple hydraulic failures. Crews should brief the cabin and prepare for possible firm touchdown and directional control challenges on rollout.

A brief note on field versus runway: an off‑airport landing may be survivable and even preferred in some extreme fuel or systems failure scenarios. The decision matrix is simple in principle and brutal in practice. If the aircraft cannot reach a suitable runway with acceptable stopping margin, the crew must look for the best available flat area, consider soft ground hazards, and plan the evacuation sequence. Past incidents such as the Ural A321 forced landing in 2019 show that crews can get passengers out safely even when the available landing site is unconventional, but those outcomes depend on decisive crew action and effective coordination with emergency services when they can be reached.

For operators and regulators there are some plain recommendations I would press from the jump:

  • Treat major hydraulic failures in preflight and dispatch planning as you would any time limited system. That means ensuring alternates within a realistic diversion time, clear fuel policy for degraded‑systems scenarios, and daily tracking of any system defects against MEL items that could compound risk. The FAAs ETOPS framework is instructive here because it forces operators to think in terms of system endurance, not just engine reliability.

  • Simulate degraded braking and steering in recurrent training. Many crews never see a hydraulic leak in service. Running realistic simulator scenarios where nose wheel steering or normal brakes are lost will improve decision making under stress and reduce the chance of a poor diversion choice. Training should include firm touchdown techniques, planning for runway overruns, and managing a rapid evacuation.

  • Maintain access to approved spare parts and documented procedures for degraded operations. The aviation system only works when operators, OEMs and regulators accept the cost of readiness. Keeping the fleet airworthy and parts available matters for safety and for preventing operators from being forced into marginal choices.

If an A320 from any operator were to require an off‑airport landing because of a hydraulic failure, the crew, dispatch and rescue services must be operating from the same, conservative playbook. That playbook has to err on the side of longer runways and earlier decisions to divert. The technical reality of the A320 hydraulic architecture means a single circuit loss can produce outsized operational effects on braking and steering. Plan for that to translate into more landing distance required and less directional control on rollout, not less. Combined with prudent fuel management and a willingness to accept a closer or longer runway, most hydraulic failure outcomes are survivable without loss of life.