As of June 1 2023 there is no publicly reported midair collision involving jets over Port Phillip Bay. That caveat matters because the headline in the brief asked a blunt question about protocols being questioned. You cannot reasonably critique a specific accident that has not occurred in the public record. What you can and should do is use the question as an opportunity to examine how we manage risk around displays over water and populated coastlines, and whether existing approvals and oversight would stand up in a worst case scenario.

My perspective is practical and pilot centric. Air displays and formation work look simple from the ground but they are high risk when margins are thin. The kind of risks that lead to catastrophic outcomes fall into three broad buckets: planning and oversight, aircraft and modification integrity, and human factors in the cockpit and on the ground.

On planning and oversight the Australian record shows regulators and investigators have been pushing for stronger, clearer tools for approvals and supervision of air displays. The ATSB raised concerns about the adequacy of CASA’s approval and oversight tools after a fatal display accident in 2017 and has urged better guidance and structured assessment of organisers and display personnel. That pushed CASA to revise its Air Display guidance and publish AC 91-21 in late 2022 to give clearer process for applications and risk assessments. These steps are positive, but implementation details matter. An advisory circular and forms are only as effective as the people who use them and the inspectors who enforce them.

Aircraft type and maintenance are not academic details. Historic airshow disasters offer hard lessons. The AAIB investigation into the 2015 Shoreham airshow crash in the UK found a mix of low entry heights for aerobatic manoeuvres, unclear application of minimum display heights, and shortcomings in oversight and risk management. The Reno Air Races accident in 2011 is a separate lesson about the consequences of untested or undocumented modifications to high performance warbirds and the catastrophic outcomes that follow structural or control system failures at race speeds. Those accidents show that when spectacle drives display choices the result can be fatal for pilots and bystanders alike. Regulators in every jurisdiction learned from those inquiries that approvals cannot rest on reputation or tradition alone.

A few practical points for operators and regulators, from a pilot who flies and consults on integration projects:

  • Pre display briefings must be written and standardised. Every aerial filming sortie or formation pass should have a signed brief that states roles, contingency triggers, minimum heights and lateral separation, escape manoeuvres and the authority of the Flying Display Director to abort. Verbal briefings alone will fail when workload spikes.

  • Filming operations require special treatment. What is benign in a shoot done at altitude can become hazardous when crews ask for tighter geometry to get a “better” shot. If an operation is effectively a display or exhibition for the public it should be authorised as an air display under the regulations rather than treated as an ad hoc joy flight or promotional sortie. That is not just regulatory nitpicking. The legislative framework requires notification and organiser responsibilities for exhibitions and film work so the task is to make sure the activity is captured by the approval process when it exposes the public to risk.

  • Competency and recency checks for display pilots must be objective. A CV or anecdotal reputation does not substitute for documented evidence that the pilot can safely perform the planned manoeuvres. Where non-standard aircraft are used or where ex-military platforms are flown in civil displays there should be explicit checks on configuration, egress systems, and whether ejection seats or other legacy systems are serviceable and documented.

  • Modifications and maintenance standards for high performance display aircraft need independent scrutiny. The Reno inquiry showed how modifications that change handling or reduce structural margin can be invisible risks until they fail catastrophically. For aircraft not in a mainstream commercial maintenance system a stricter regime for inspection, modification logging and independent signoff is required.

  • Crowd and external zone management. No matter how conservative a display profile is, organisers must assume spectators will watch from outside the venue boundary. That vulnerability means minimum heights and display tracks must consider off-site impact areas and emergency response times. Organisers should coordinate with local authorities to manage viewing that occurs outside the fenced display footprint.

  • Data collection for investigation and learning. If the goal is prevention then events must be investigated comprehensively. Onboard cameras, GPS/ADS-B logs and recorded radio comms materially assist investigators. Where flight data recorders are impractical the industry should adopt standardised recording suites for display aircraft so post event analysis can focus on cause rather than speculation.

For regulators the ask is simple. Do not treat advisory guidance as a finish line. Publish clear, auditable criteria for display approvals. Require that display approval documentation be retained in a central database with capability for trend analysis and targeted surveillance. The ATSB recommended improvements in CASA’s approval and oversight tools for a reason. Implementation and surveillance are the next steps.

For operators and pilots the ask is equally straightforward. Plan for the unplanned. Build abort points into every manoeuvre, respect minimum heights and speeds, and say no to last minute requests that materially change geometry. If a cameraman asks for a closer run for the shot you owe it to the people on the ground and in your cockpit to push back. Spectacle is not a substitute for safety.

If a Port Phillip Bay jet collision is ever reported the investigators will need clear records to work from. That is why the practices above matter now even if, as of June 1 2023, no such collision appears in the public record. Prevention is far cheaper than response. Operators, organisers and regulators who treat approval paperwork as a box to tick will find out too late how brittle the system can be. Take the paperwork seriously, standardise the briefings, and make oversight measurable. Those changes reduce the chance that one headline can destroy lives and livelihoods.