On 15 April 2023 fighting erupted at Khartoum International Airport and civilian aircraft parked on the ramp were caught in the crossfire. Visual and satellite evidence showed multiple commercial airliners burned or heavily damaged. Among the aircraft widely reported as affected were a Saudia A330 that was preparing for departure and at least one SkyUp aircraft that activated its emergency beacon while on the ground. These initial reports came from aviation press coverage and analysis of satellite imagery.

A factual correction matters for policy clarity. Social and media confusion led some to conflate types and operators. The larger twinjet on fire was identified in contemporaneous reporting as a Saudia A330, while SkyUp operated Boeing 737 aircraft in Khartoum under wet-lease arrangements. SkyUp confirmed two aircraft were at Khartoum and that local personnel had been placed in safe locations while the carrier coordinated with diplomatic channels.

Satellite imagery and open source analysis painted the scale of the loss. Imagery providers and news outlets reported that a significant number of civilian and cargo aircraft on the apron had been destroyed or rendered unserviceable within days of the outbreak of hostilities. That visual record is important because it documents how a single airport becomes an instant point of catastrophic asset loss when active combat reaches the field of operations.

Legal and regulatory framing

The Khartoum damage highlights two overlapping legal responsibilities that remain under-implemented in many conflict-prone states. First, contracting states under the Chicago Convention retain sovereignty over territory but also bear responsibility to provide the aerodrome infrastructure, services and security measures necessary for safe international civil aviation operations. ICAO standards and recommended practices address aerodrome design, operation and security and require states to report acts of unlawful interference. Those texts form the baseline of state obligations and of the international community’s expectations when civil aircraft operate within a state’s territory.

Second, where private operators place aircraft into foreign airports under wet-lease or ACMI arrangements, contractual risk shifts become acute. An operator who positions aircraft in another state is exposed to on-the-ground security, regulatory continuity, and emergency response capabilities that are outside its direct control. Those commercial arrangements do not relieve the host state of the duty to protect aerodrome operations nor do they absolve the operator of due diligence obligations before deploying assets into higher risk environments.

Operational and policy lessons

1) Pre-deployment risk assessments must be mandatory and standardized. Airlines and leasing firms increasingly use wet-lease and ACMI contracts to serve markets quickly. Before assets are sent to a fragile state they must be subject to a standardized, auditable risk assessment that evaluates the security of aprons and gates, availability of secure sheltered parking, the presence and reliability of firefighting and rescue services, and the likelihood of military use or targeting of the aerodrome.

2) Contractual terms need a clearer international template. Lease and wet-lease contracts must include trigger clauses for rapid repositioning, evacuation of local staff, and clear assignment of responsibilities for repatriation of crews, preservation of records, and immediate post-incident notification to registries and insurers. Those clauses should also address access to the aircraft for lessors and insurers in the event that local security collapses.

3) Host state obligations should be enforced and audited. ICAO SARPs lay out the expectations for aerodrome operations and security. Where states cannot meet those standards, ICAO and regional bodies must step up with contingency guidance and expedited technical assistance to reduce the hazard of parked aircraft becoming collateral losses. Reporting requirements under Annex 17 create an entry point for transparent documentation and for mobilising international aviation safety support.

4) International coordination on evacuation and asset protection is essential. States, airlines, lessors and insurers need pre-negotiated pathways for emergency movement of aircraft out of a rising-threat environment. That requires diplomatic channels to be mapped in peacetime and rehearsed through exercises that include embassy evacuation planning, overflight clearances for repositioning legs, and rapid issuance of temporary permits.

5) Use of independent remote sensing and open source verification should be institutionalised. The Khartoum case showed how satellite imagery provided rapid, independent verification of damage and can be used to establish an evidentiary baseline for insurers, registries and regulators. International agencies should maintain access options for lower income states that cannot themselves purchase frequent imagery subscriptions.

A regulatory gap that deserves attention

ICAO standards set useful baselines but they rely on national implementation. When conflict erupts quickly, aircraft become fixed, high-value targets at a single point. This concentration risk is not new but it is under-accounted for in oversight frameworks that assume peacetime operations. The industry and states should work together to produce a focused guidance package for operations in or near fragile states. That package should include a harmonised risk rating, mandatory pre-deployment declarations, minimum physical protection measures for parked aircraft and a fast track for temporary re-registration or export of assets when evacuation is required.

Conclusion

Khartoum in April 2023 was a blunt reminder that airports are not neutral infrastructure in conflict. They are critical nodes that, if contested, can intensify humanitarian and economic damage while producing expensive, avoidable losses to civilian aviation. The technical solutions are straightforward: better pre-deployment risk analysis, contract templates that allocate emergency responsibilities, stronger state implementation of ICAO SARPs, and ready international mechanisms to move people and aircraft before a siege becomes a write-off. The harder work is political. Aviation regulators, operators and lessors must press for a practical, enforceable framework that treats aircraft and aerodrome resilience as a shared public good rather than a negotiable commercial afterthought.