As a line pilot who has taxied to the hold short and watched the tower radio light up about a small unmanned aircraft in the traffic pattern, I do not need a theoretical briefing to tell me why drones near airports are a real operational hazard. They are small, hard to see from the flight deck, and increasingly capable. The industry has seen headline disruptions that should have been wake up calls, yet policy and practical capability have lagged in too many places.
Consider the scale of the problem. High profile incidents like the shutdown of London Gatwick over the 2018 Christmas period exposed how fragile airport operations can be when a persistent, unauthorized aerial intruder shows up. That event grounded hundreds of flights and left tens of thousands of passengers stranded while authorities struggled to locate and stop the threat.
On a day to day basis the problem is persistent rather than episodic. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration reports hundreds of unmanned aircraft sightings near airports and says it receives on the order of more than 100 such reports each month. That is not a trend you can shrug off as rare anomalies. It is a steady pressure on airspace safety that affects pilots, controllers, and airport operators.
Why has the global response been so slow and piecemeal? Part of it is legal and technical. In many jurisdictions the laws that protect the national airspace also limit physical or electronic countermeasures. In the United States, for example, a range of federal statutes and regulations constrain jamming, seizure, or destructive interdiction of an aircraft in flight. As a result most civil authorities are left with detection and investigative tools while mitigation authority remains tightly controlled and often restricted to specific federal agencies. That legal reality creates response gaps at the very locations where rapid action would be most valuable.
Another contributor has been fragmented regulation and slow harmonization. The European Union moved early to create a common regulatory baseline with technical and operational rules published in 2019, but adoption and operationalization across member states took time. Meanwhile other national regulators progressed at different speeds. The result is a patchwork of obligations for manufacturers, operators, and law enforcement rather than a single coherent global standard. For aircraft operators who fly internationally and for airports that host airlines from many countries, patchwork rules are an operational liability.
Technology is not the full answer, but it is part of it. Airports and governments have invested in detection and counter-UAS systems since Gatwick, and many airport operators now field multi-sensor detection suites. Those systems can give situational awareness that controllers and police lacked in earlier incidents. But detection without lawful, scalable mitigation leaves airports alarmed and constrained. Investment without clear protocols and legal authority to act is a bandage, not a cure. Real world operations need both accurate detection and an agreed, lawful chain for deciding if and how to stop an intruder.
A policy example worth noting is Remote ID. The idea of an electronic “license plate” for unmanned aircraft is not new and has been framed as a foundational step toward accountability. U.S. regulators published a Remote ID rule that lays out the concept of broadcast identification and timelines for manufacturers and operators. That rule is necessary, but a single rule cannot retroactively fix years of uneven adoption and it cannot on its own give frontline responders the authority they need to interdict dangerous flights.
From where I sit in the cockpit, the right approach is practical and incremental. Regulators, airports, and law enforcement should focus on three operational priorities.
1) Improve detection plus a clear mitigation pathway. Airports need multi-sensor detection and positive identification tools tied to lawful mitigation options. Detection that only leads to hours of investigation and no immediate remedy is a liability. When mitigation is necessary regulators should have pre-authorized, limited options for trained teams to act in ways that minimize collateral risk to people on the ground and to manned traffic.
2) Harmonize identification and enforcement. Remote ID is a necessary component. But Remote ID needs to be supported by clear enforcement protocols that work across jurisdictions. If a drone is broadcasting its identity from another country, authorities must have streamlined processes to identify the responsible party and apply penalties. International harmonization through ICAO and regional bodies should be accelerated so aircraft operators and airports can rely on consistent rules.
3) Improve pilot, controller, and airport procedures. Aviation thrives on procedure. We have learned to treat bird strikes, runway incursions, and engine failures with checklists and rehearsed responses. Drones deserve the same approach. That means standard reporting formats, swift tactical responses that controllers can initiate, and exercises that include law enforcement and counter-UAS assets. Detection vendors must integrate with airport operations centers and air traffic control so a single tactical picture guides decisions.
There are no perfect answers. Any mitigation carries risk to people and to the integrity of the airspace. That is precisely why policymakers have been cautious. But continued caution without pragmatic delegation of limited mitigation authority, without harmonized identification and enforcement, and without investment in the human procedures and training that let technology be used safely will mean more airport disruptions and more near misses.
If airports and regulators do not accelerate the operational side of their response the industry will continue to see costly interruptions and increased risk. We can fix this. Start by treating UAS intrusions as an operational risk requiring the same planning discipline we use for other airspace hazards. Push for interoperable Remote ID and faster legal pathways for safe mitigation. Fund multi-sensor detection and, critically, train the people who must act on the data. The plane in the hold short does not care about regulatory inertia. Pilots and passengers deserve an airspace where rules, tools, and people work together to keep the skies safe.