On 2 January 2023 two Eurocopter EC130 helicopters operated by the same tourism company collided above the Gold Coast Broadwater while one was landing and the other departing. The impact occurred at low level, roughly 130 feet above the water, about 23 seconds into the departing helicopter’s flight. Four people died and several more were seriously injured as a result.

The operational setting matters. These flights were in non controlled airspace where the safety model is based on see and avoid supplemented by pilots making position and intentions broadcasts on the common traffic advisory frequency known as CTAF. Australian guidance and regulation make those broadcasts mandatory when necessary to avoid a collision, and the published guidance defines the “vicinity” of an aerodrome as within 10 nautical miles and at heights where operations could conflict. In practice that means short scenic flights, adjacent helipads and frequent turning traffic create a busy visual environment that is not the same as a controlled aerodrome.

What the early ATSB material and eyewitness reports made clear is that the separation relied upon that day failed at two linked points. First, one pilot reported not hearing a taxi or departure call from the other aircraft. Second, the arriving pilot did not see the departing helicopter before impact despite passengers later attempting to warn the crew. The investigation highlighted that video and modelling would be used to study cockpit sightlines and the nature of the radio transmissions. Those are the kind of single points of failure that can turn a minor sequencing error into a catastrophe.

From a pilot perspective there are a small number of practical separation rules and good habits that reduce risk in this environment. These are not new ideas, but they are worth restating given how unforgiving low level helicopter operations are:

  • Treat see and avoid as fragile. Visual acquisition can be blocked by frames, doors, seats, sun angle or passengers. If you cannot positively see the other helicopter, assume it might be where you are planning to go. Make your escape path and contingency actions explicit before you begin taxi or takeoff.
  • Make timely, standard, and repeatable radio calls. Use published CTAF phraseology early enough that other traffic can build a mental picture. A single missed or failed transmission is a single point of failure. Confirm your radio and antenna function during preflight and, when duties allow, verify that your call was acknowledged on the frequency.
  • Reduce simultaneous operations in adjacent pads. When helipads are close together, stagger departures and arrivals so that one aircraft is well clear before the next is committed. Visual confirmation of clearance is preferable to relying only on a one line radio call.
  • Use a ground coordinator when available. A trained ground person monitoring traffic and the radio can add a layer of defence by delaying boarding or takeoff when other traffic is inbound. That person should have clear authority to halt departures. Ground situational awareness is inexpensive insurance against a cockpit blind spot.
  • Fit effective traffic awareness equipment where practicable. Systems such as ADS B-IN traffic displays or portable traffic awareness apps on electronic flight bags are not perfect substitutes for see and avoid, but they provide an additional cue set. There is no regulatory blanket requirement for airborne TCAS in these small tour helicopters, so operators who choose to equip should treat the gear as a complementary defence rather than a primary control.
  • Formalise procedures when introducing new aircraft types or new pads. Changes in aircraft type can change sightlines, rotor disc visibility and handling characteristics. Any change that affects the visual or communication environment deserves a documented risk assessment and a staged implementation plan. The human factors around operational change are often underestimated.

Regulation and advisory material already require broadcasts and encourage conservative use of frequencies in the vicinity of non controlled aerodromes. The practical gap is how operators translate those broad duties into tight, everyday routines for tourist flights that run dozens of cycles per day. The Gold Coast event shows how a failed transmission and a missed visual contact, separated by seconds, are enough to defeat the usual layers of protection.

If you operate or supervise scenic helicopter flights start with three immediate checks: verify your radios and antenna performance before passenger loading, enforce a conservative sequencing rule for adjacent pads, and give ground staff explicit authority and checklist items to stop a departure if the frequency is not clear. Those steps will not eliminate risk, but they do remove the simple single points of failure that allowed this accident to happen.

Regulators and operators need to treat high tempo, low level tour operations like a special airspace case. Where traffic density and terrain create conflict points, see and avoid alone is not an adequate hazard control. The industry should push for layered defences: disciplined radio procedures, effective ground coordination, appropriate traffic awareness equipment, and documented change management when aircraft or helipads are introduced or relocated. The goal is to make loss of separation harder to achieve and easier to detect with time to act.

The ATSB’s investigation work remains essential. It will take careful analysis to determine how much any single factor contributed and which systemic fixes are necessary. In the meantime the operational lessons are clear and actionable. Pilots and operators who internalise them will reduce the odds that another short scenic flight ends in tragedy.