The technical sequence uncovered in the February preliminary report left little doubt about what killed Yeti Airlines Flight 691. Both propellers went to feather in the base leg of the approach, the crew reported no power, and within seconds the ATR entered a stall and hit terrain. Those are tidy, deadly facts. What they do not show directly is the decision chain in the cockpit that should have prevented the outcome. That is where a final report will almost certainly focus, and why a missed or failed go-around is a critical operational issue for pilots and operators to reckon with.

From an operational perspective the accident reads like a classic loss of control driven by a sudden loss of thrust at low altitude while flying a nonstabilized visual approach. The flight data and CVR excerpts made public in the investigation’s preliminary phase show the pilot flying calling for flaps 30 and the flight crew configuring for landing on the tight visual circuit to runway 12 at the recently opened Pokhara airport. Instead of that single, predictable action the propeller condition levers were moved to feather, producing an immediate loss of thrust. At the same time the approach profile did not meet stabilized approach criteria for the final stages of the turn and alignment. When configuration, speed or flight path are outside stabilized parameters on final, the correct and practiced response is go-around, immediately and without negotiation. Go-arounds are not evidence of poor airmanship. They are a primary safety tool.

Why a go-around matters here

A go-around buys time and energy. With altitude and airspeed you can diagnose warnings, reconfigure the aircraft, and run non-normal flows or checklists. In this accident the combination of low altitude, a tight visual circuit, and a sudden power loss left little time for diagnosis and recovery. If the crew had been stabilized at the published gate and met the stabilization criteria, or had already elected a go-around when the approach became tight and unstable, the subsequent surprise of feathered props would have occurred at an altitude and energy state with far better recovery margins. In plain pilot terms, energy and altitude are your margin for error. Lose both inside a turn and you have very little left to work with.

What the preliminary evidence suggests about crew actions

The recorded sequence shows role changes in the cockpit, callouts about configuration, and ultimately the PF or PM detecting no torque and no thrust. Human factors show up in several ways: a high workload environment during an unfamiliar visual approach, nonstandard cockpit flows, and indications that checklist discipline and sterile cockpit procedures were not strictly observed. The preliminary findings and contemporaneous reporting also highlighted that the new visual circuit for runway 12 required tight turns that made it hard to meet stabilized approach criteria. Regulators had flagged the circuit’s hazards during the airport’s validation phase and published guidance afterwards, which underlines that operational context contributed to cockpit workload.

So will the final report call this a “missed go-around”? Probably not in a single label. The most useful outcome for crews will be a breakdown of why the go-around was not executed when the approach parameters deviated from stabilized criteria and why the crew did not recognise and correct the misconfiguration and engine indications in time. Expect strong emphasis on these systemic items:

  • Stabilized approach discipline. If the approach cannot meet the stabilized gate for visual operations, crews must go around. That simple rule protects energy state and decision time.
  • Clear, validated visual procedures for constrained fields. Pokhara’s runway 12 visual circuit was tight and required validation and training before routine line use. That is a regulator and operator responsibility.
  • CRM and sterile cockpit. High workload phases require tight task sharing and immediate, unambiguous callouts. When something as fundamental as “no power” goes unheard or unacted on, the cockpit dynamic has failed.
  • Physical design and human factors. Condition levers and flap levers that are easily confused under stress are a latent threat. Procedural mitigations and type-specific training matter.
  • Management of change. Introducing a new airport and circuit into routine operations requires robust training, validation flights, and simulator practice where feasible.

Practical takeaways for pilots and operators today

1) Treat the go-around as a first-order safety action. If the approach is unstable by briefed criteria, fly the published missed approach. Practice the maneuver until it becomes second nature. 2) Enforce sterile cockpit on final. Non-essential conversation while configuring to land is a recurrent human factors trap. 3) Crosscheck visually and by instrument the configuration callouts. A confirmed visual check of flaps and a crosscheck of engine indications are quick, high-value checks when workload rises. 4) For operators: validate visual circuits and ensure crews receive scenario-based training before assigning traffic to new or constrained approaches. 5) Regulators: require and enforce stabilized approach criteria that are appropriate to local terrain and visual circuits, and make sure management of change processes are followed before new aerodromes open for scheduled service.

What matters going forward

We do not yet have a finished, public final report as of this writing, and the investigation will produce the formal recommendations and probable cause language. But the factual skeleton already released points to a preventable chain: unstable approach conditions, an unexpected and catastrophic configuration change, and too little altitude and energy to recover. A robust safety system treats the go-around not as a failure but as the mechanism that preserves the margin allowing crews to manage the unexpected. If the final report highlights that the flight continued below stabilized criteria instead of initiating an immediate go-around, that should be taken not only as a finding but as a clear directive for change across training, procedure design, and aerodrome validation. Aviation safety is about managing small errors before they cascade into disaster. The go-around is one of our best tools to do that.