As of January 24, 2024 there is no widely reported fatal helicopter accident involving Sebastián Piñera. With that caveat, the question of how states and private principals manage the safety of VIP rotorcraft flights is urgent. VIP flights present predictable pressure points for safety and regulatory gaps. Examining past VIP helicopter accidents and established safety guidance shows a clear set of operational and regulatory fixes that should be standard wherever heads of state, former presidents, or other high profile figures travel by helicopter.

Human factors and mission pressure

Investigations into high profile helicopter accidents repeatedly identify plan continuation bias and self induced pressure as central contributors to poor decisions in marginal conditions. The NTSB analysis of a well known 2020 accident concluded that the pilot continued VFR flight into instrument conditions, became spatially disoriented, and likely experienced self induced pressure tied to the importance of the passenger. That combination of human factors and inadequate operator safety oversight is a cautionary tale for any VIP operation.

Operationally, the fix is straightforward but culturally difficult. Operators should bake objective flight risk assessment tools into preflight decision making so that weather degradation, pilot currency, route difficulty, and passenger sensitivity are quantified before a take off. These tools reduce the single pilot or PIC from facing a binary decision of go or no go under social pressure. Industry guidance from business aviation groups recommends FRATs and other objective checks as best practice.

Aircraft capability and equipment

Not all rotorcraft are created equal for VIP work. Many light helicopters commonly used for short VIP hops are certified for VFR operations and lack instrumentation or systems needed for safe flight in instrument meteorological conditions. Regulatory and manufacturer guidance caution that VFR equipped helicopters are especially vulnerable if a pilot inadvertently encounters degraded visibility. Where operations regularly traverse marginal weather, operators should use IFR equipped aircraft and crews trained and current for instrument flight. The FAA lessons on specific light helicopter accident types highlight these limitations and the fatal consequences of continuing VFR into IMC.

For flights over water or terrain where a forced landing is difficult, operators must carry appropriate survival equipment and conduct effective passenger briefings. Past accidents show that even when lifejackets and liferafts are present, lack of a passenger briefing and unclear equipment access can degrade survivability. Regulatory sections governing extended overwater operations already impose equipment and briefing requirements for commercial operations, but private and state flights can sometimes fall into regulatory gaps. The prudent standard is to apply commercial grade overwater contingency equipment and briefings to all VIP rotorcraft flights that could reasonably end in water.

Safety management systems and operational control

A recurring theme in accident investigations is the absence of a robust safety management system and independent operational control. SMS frameworks promoted by ICAO and incorporated in many national regimes require operators to identify hazards, assess risks, and implement mitigations proportionate to the operation. For VIP flights the critical mitigations include: mandatory FRAT or equivalent, formal SOPs for diversion and go/no go authority, and an accountable operational control structure that can override informal passenger or owner pressure. States that rely on ad hoc arrangements for presidential or ex presidential flights should consider applying SMS expectations to any organization that routinely provides VIP air transport.

Data capture and post event learning

Investigations are hampered when light helicopters lack recorded flight data. The absence of readily available flight data complicates root cause analysis and delays systemic fixes. Regulators should evaluate requiring lightweight recording devices for helicopters used in passenger transport, or at least for those performing regular VIP missions. That requirement will improve accident investigation quality and yield better safety recommendations for the future. The NTSB and industry commentators have repeatedly urged broader use of recorders after high profile accidents.

Regulatory and contractual recommendations

1) Apply operator accreditation. States should require that any entity providing recurrent VIP air transport operate under an AOC or equivalent with documented SMS, or be contracted through an accredited air operator. This reduces the risk that private owner flown flights escape the oversight applied to commercial providers.

2) Mandate objective preflight risk assessment. FRATs or equivalent tools should be mandatory for VIP flights. The result must be a documented risk score and specified mitigations or a no go determination. Peer review or dispatch signoff should be required where scores exceed conservative thresholds.

3) Strengthen equipment and training thresholds. For flights where weather can degrade or where overwater or confined area operations are possible, require IFR capable aircraft, instrument rated crews, or stricter weather minima. Ensure passenger survival equipment and passenger briefings match commercial standards for similar exposure.

4) Separate operational authority. Create a functional separation between the owner, the passenger and the in flight pilot for go/no go decisions. An operational control office or an independent Duty Pilot with delegated authority can mitigate self induced pressure on pilots. SMS procedures should codify that separation.

5) Require lightweight recorders on VIP aircraft used for passenger transport. Mandate at minimum a cockpit voice or digital recording and basic flight parameter capture for accident investigation. The NTSB has recommended wider use of recording devices in passenger helicopters following high profile crashes.

Conclusion

VIP helicopter flights are low frequency and high consequence. The human, technical and regulatory ingredients that combine to produce risk are well understood. The policy challenge is to translate accumulated lessons into binding requirements for operations that carry heads of state and other high profile individuals. Objective preflight risk tools, operator accreditation with SMS, appropriate equipment and a clear separation of operational authority are practical reforms that would reduce preventable tragedies. Chilean authorities and other states that allow informal VIP aviation arrangements should treat these reforms as minimal safety hygiene, not optional best practice. Regulators can no longer rely on privilege to justify regulatory exceptions. The lives at stake demand a predictable, auditable and modern approach to VIP rotorcraft safety.