Note for readers: this article is written from the vantage point of developments known up to and including 18 April 2024. It does not report a new Gazpromavia accident. Instead it examines the structural risks around Russia’s Sukhoi Superjet 100 fleet and explains why regulators, operators, and international partners should be attentive to how those risks could translate into accidents.
The headline risk: cumulative vulnerability, not a single failure. The Superjet 100 entered service with high expectations as Russia’s first modern regional jet. High profile accidents in its short history exposed three overlapping problem sets that still matter in 2024: operational and training gaps, design and integration exposures, and supply chain fragility driven by geopolitics and sanctions. Those three vectors amplify each other. The result is an elevated policy risk for regulators and an operational risk for airlines that continue to fly and maintain the type.
Operational and human factors remain the prime failure mode in the Superjet’s accident history. The demonstration flight that struck Mount Salak in Indonesia in May 2012 remains a clear reminder that even a new design can be undone by poor situational awareness, ambiguous procedures, and cockpit culture that permits distraction in critical phases of flight. Investigators concluded crew actions and misinterpretation of alerts contributed to that catastrophe. More recently, the Aeroflot runway fire at Sheremetyevo in May 2019 showed how an external event combined with manual handling and evacuation issues to produce a large loss of life. Those accidents are not mere historical footnotes. They frame the kinds of failure chains that regulators must plan to mitigate across training, procedures, and design guidance.
Technical integration and support complexity have always been part of the Superjet program. The aircraft uses Western-sourced systems and engines in key areas, which created a dependency on global supply chains and on foreign maintenance ecosystems for certain subsystems. That situation was manageable when the program had broad international support. But the commercial and maintenance ecosystem around the type has been constrained: international customers and lessors have shown caution, and several operators have reported lower dispatch reliability than comparable regional types. The combination of nontrivial technical complexity and a comparatively small worldwide support network raises the bar for operators who intend to keep these jets in revenue service.
Sanctions and spare parts shortages materially change the safety calculus. After 2022, Western manufacturers, lessors and service providers largely withdrew routine support for aircraft operating in Russia. Independent reporting documented cases where airlines were cannibalizing aircraft to keep others flying and where Russia sought alternative, grey channel, or domestic workarounds to preserve airworthiness. That is not an abstract supply chain story. When airlines have to remove traceable life-limited parts, or rely on improvised maintenance pathways, the conventional safety margins erode. Regulators and operators must treat that as a systemic risk to be managed, not an operational detail.
Regulatory consequences and the international oversight gap. International bodies signalled concern. In 2022 the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration publicly downgraded its assessment of Russia’s civil aviation authority under the IASA program, a formal recognition that oversight arrangements had become nonstandard. That downgrade, and parallel public concern from aviation safety bodies, create friction for certification reciprocity, access to shared maintenance resources, and the normal channels of safety assistance that lessen accident risk in a globally interoperable sector. In short, a de facto closure of parts of the international safety ecosystem increases the potential for latent hazards to persist uncorrected.
What this means for Gazpromavia and similar operators. Gazpromavia has been an operator and customer of the Superjet family and part of the early operator base for the type. Operators of small fleets face particular exposure: fewer spare-aircraft buffers, thinner pools of type-rated technicians, and more incentive to extend or bend maintenance cycles under economic pressure. Those conditions raise the likelihood that a routine maintenance error, missed deferred defect, or an out-of-spec installation could cascade into a flight safety event. Regulators should treat single-operator problems as potential systemic hazards when they affect a narrow supply chain.
Policy and enforcement prescriptions. If policymakers and aviation authorities want to reduce the probability of another high consequence Superjet event they should consider three near-term, concrete steps:
1) Transparent audit of maintenance shops that perform heavy checks on SSJ fleet aircraft. Audits must include records traceability, parts provenance, and tooling controls. Where supply chains are improvised, document and validate the quality controls in place. Regulators need access to paper and digital logs. Failure to enforce traceability increases latent failure risk.
2) Mandatory training and concise special-situation checklists for flight crews. Historical accidents show that unexpected system behaviour and ambiguous warnings are catalysts for error. Regulators should require operators to carry special-situation procedures that address rare but catastrophic sensor and air-data disagreements. Checklists must be practical, short, and trained until they are reflexive.
3) International cooperation mechanisms for technical assistance that avoid sanction violations while preserving safety. ICAO and neutral third parties can broker safety-focused, transparency-first arrangements. That may include supervised access to OEM technical bulletins, remote technical support under monitored conditions, or engagement models that allow verification of parts authenticity without contravening sanctions. Where legal constraints exist, the safety imperative argues for creative, accountable workarounds rather than informal shadow practices.
Operational recommendations for carriers. Operators should immediately adopt low-cost defensive measures: institute conservative dispatch criteria for SSJ flights, expand mandatory double checks on critical sensors during post-maintenance flights, and avoid ferry flights without independent verification of maintenance tasks. If any doubt remains about the provenance or installation of flight-critical parts, the aircraft should remain grounded until independent verification is completed. Those are not luxury precautions. They are prudent risk control when the maintenance supply chain is constrained.
Final point for policy makers and industry watchers. The Superjet’s record demonstrates that modern regional jets are only as safe as the ecosystem that supports them. For Russia’s fleet the ecosystem has been under acute pressure since 2022. That pressure makes errors more consequential and reduces the available margin for recovery if a maintenance lapse or an unusual system failure occurs. On the policy side, transparency, audited maintenance, and prioritized training are practical levers to reduce accident probability. On the operational side, conservative dispatch standards and independent verification will reduce the odds that a maintenance or parts problem becomes a crash. These measures are basic. They are also essential.
Acknowledgement of scope. This piece focuses on structural risk and policy remedies available as of 18 April 2024. It does not report any new Gazpromavia crash. Readers seeking accident-specific reporting should consult the investigative authorities and contemporary, verified newsroom coverage.