As a legal and policy analyst I will be clear from the outset: this is a risk analysis and policy brief framed against historical precedent. By August 13, 2024 there is no established, widely reported case of an Azerbaijan Embraer E190 being struck by a missile. That hypothetical however is useful because past shootdowns show how quickly aviation safety, international law and geopolitics collide when a civilian aircraft is damaged or destroyed over or near conflict zones.

Two painful precedents shape the obligations and options available to states, investigators and regulators. Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 in 2014 demonstrated that a civil airliner can be destroyed by a surface to air missile while transiting a contested battlefield, producing long, complex criminal and diplomatic processes under international law. The investigation and follow on prosecutions exposed persistent gaps in airspace risk assessment and information sharing.

Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS752 in 2020 shows another pattern. In that case a commercial jet was shot down shortly after departure by a state air-defence unit operating in a heightened alert environment. The resulting admission, legal claims and compensation negotiations illustrated how state responsibility, rules of engagement and the rights of victims intersect with aviation safety obligations.

Operational context matters. Since 2022 the Russo Ukrainian conflict has expanded the footprint of military activity, including both long range strikes and waves of drones that have triggered air-defence activations beyond immediate front lines. In July 2024 and in the weeks surrounding it there were numerous reports of drone and missile activity inside and near Russian territory. Those operations increase the probability that air-defence systems will be active at civilian altitudes or that fragments and countermeasures will affect nearby civil traffic.

Aviation regulators and industry bodies have long recognised these risks. Conflict zone guidance, NOTAM practice and the conflict-zone information bulletins that regulators issue are the principal tools for communicating risk to operators. Regulators have repeatedly cautioned operators to exercise special caution in areas where military operations place civil aircraft at risk. The practical effect of those advisories depends on timely intelligence sharing and the willingness of operators to reroute, at cost.

If an Azerbaijan E190 were struck by missile fragments the legal and procedural consequences would fall into four linked tracks: immediate safety response, technical investigation, state responsibility and regulatory reform.

Immediate safety response

  • Preserve evidence and treat the site as both an accident and a potential criminal scene. Flight recorders, ATC recordings and radar/ADS B/comms logs must be secured immediately and without unilateral destruction or concealment by any party. Investigators must insist on chain of custody rules consistent with Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention and common criminal-practice standards.
  • Rapid, multi jurisdictional coordination is mandatory. If the aircraft is over or near the territory of a state conducting military operations, neutral or third party access must be negotiated early to secure wreckage and forensic traces before they degrade or are removed.

Technical investigation and transparency

  • Investigators should prioritise fragmentology and traceology. Metal fragments, warhead residue and perforation patterns are the kinds of data that differentiate an internal explosion, bird strike or structural failure from an external munition strike. Where state weapon systems are implicated, independent laboratories and internationally recognised laboratories should be invited to examine samples and the FDR/CVR data. The MH17 and PS752 processes underline the importance of independent technical corroboration.
  • Investigative transparency is essential to credibility. Governments have incentives to control narratives in conflict. Independent interim reporting, timely release of factual records (while protecting personally sensitive material) and clear statements about access for third party experts are required to preserve confidence and to allow families and affected states to make informed legal choices.

State responsibility and redress

  • When an air-defence system operated by or on behalf of a state damages a civil aircraft, questions of state responsibility, reparations and criminal accountability arise. The legal frameworks are not only ICAO instruments but also customary international law on state responsibility and specific criminal law where individual culpability can be demonstrated. The post PS752 case showed that admission, accountability and compensation remain politically fraught but legally necessary steps.
  • Aviation insurers and states will seek to allocate liability. That process will implicate diplomatic negotiations, mutual legal assistance and potentially international litigation. States whose citizens died will press for full cooperation and for access to evidence. Without timely cooperation the dispute will escalate and could produce reciprocal sanctions affecting aviation and logistics.

Regulatory and operational reforms to reduce future risk

From a policy perspective the preventable nature of many shootdowns points to several concrete reforms.

1) Improve conflict-zone intelligence and harmonise regulator guidance. Regulators should coordinate rapid, harmonised Conflict Zone Information Bulletins and NOTAMs in the earliest stages of escalatory military activity. ICAO and regional regulators must close gaps that leave third country operators with inconsistent guidance. The industry needs authoritative, timely risk assessments that are recognised across states.

2) Standardise and enforce airspace closure responsibilities. Under the Chicago Convention states have primary responsibility for the safety of their airspace. When active air-defence systems are engaged, states must proactively close airspace or impose constraints at all flight levels rather than waiting for ad hoc notices. Failure to do so creates legal exposure and moral culpability.

3) Create rapid, neutral forensic capacities. An ICAO endorsed rapid forensic panel for incidents potentially involving weapons would allow neutral sampling and analysis before evidence is removed or degraded. Such a mechanism would reduce contestable findings and speed legal processes.

4) Improve information sharing between military and civil actors. Better deconfliction protocols are needed. Those protocols must include obligations for military commands to notify civil authorities of planned activations that could affect civil altitude bands and to publish exclusion zones in machine readable formats to enable airline flight planning tools to ingest them in real time.

5) Prepare operators and crews for degraded navigation and EW environments. Crew training and SOPs for GNSS loss, ADS B gaps and declared hostile fire zones should be mandated for operators flying near conflict areas. Flight planning must include robust alternates and fuel policies that recognise the possibility of sudden long diversions.

6) Strengthen victim remedy frameworks. States should negotiate or adopt clearer frameworks for compensation and criminal cooperation in the event that a state operated weapon system strikes civilian aircraft. Predictable remedy reduces diplomatic escalation and delivers quicker justice for victims.

Conclusion

A shootdown of any commercial aircraft is an acute failure of collective systems: intelligence, regulation, military restraint and international cooperation. The cases of MH17 and PS752 show that prevention depends as much on political will and transparency as on better technology. Aviation regulators must press states to accept and discharge their primary airspace responsibilities, and ICAO should convene a focused effort to close the practical and legal gaps exposed by conflict zone incidents. Until those steps are taken the industry will continue to absorb unacceptable risk when civil flights operate anywhere near active air-defence engagements.