I searched contemporary aviation reporting and accident records up to August 20, 2024 and found no credible report of a Jeju 737 belly landing that would qualify as the deadliest crash of 2024. I will not invent events. What I can do is give a clear, pilot‑centered breakdown of how a belly landing can turn catastrophic, what history and data tell us about the main hazards, and what operators and airports must do to reduce the odds of a high‑fatality outcome.

First, the single most common wildlife hazard remains the bird strike during approach and landing. The FAA and allied authorities record that the majority of damaging bird strikes happen on approach, and that waterfowl and larger raptors are disproportionately likely to cause substantial engine or airframe damage. These strikes remain a systemic exposure for short final approach operations and for airports near wetlands or migration corridors.

From an operational perspective a gear‑up touchdown changes everything. A gear‑up touchdown can scrape engines, rupture oil or fuel systems, and damage electrical generation. If the crew manages to recognize a gear‑up or failed‑gear condition and elect to go around, the decision window is narrow. A touchdown can do immediate, sometimes irreparable, damage to engines and systems so that a subsequent go‑around is flown with degraded thrust and possibly reduced electrical power. The Pakistan PK‑8303 accident from 2020 is a stark example of that sequence. That flight touched down without landing gear, the engines sustained runway strike damage, the crew initiated a go‑around, and both engines subsequently failed. The aircraft became unrecoverable on the second approach and the outcome was catastrophic. The investigation of that event emphasized unstable approaches, failure to execute a timely missed approach, and the compounding effect of engine damage from the initial touchdown.

That is not to say every gear‑up case ends in disaster. There are successful, well controlled gear‑up landings where crew technique, communications, fuel planning, and emergency services coordination preserved life. LOT Flight 16 in 2011 is an example where a long transatlantic crew faced a hydraulic failure that prevented gear extension, the crew burned off fuel, coordinated with emergency services, executed a deliberate gear‑up landing, and evacuated everyone without serious injury. Training, calm CRM, and deliberate energy management made the difference.

Where a belly landing turns into a mass casualty event is almost always the combination of three failures stacking together: severe systems damage that prevents safe continued flight, inadequate runway end protection, and unsuitable infrastructure beyond the runway that converts an overrun into an explosion or a structural breakup. This is where runway end safety area standards and engineered arresting systems matter. International and national guidance calls for runway end safety areas and in constrained airports the installation of EMAS beds is a proven mitigation that can stop overruns with much lower risk of post‑impact fire or breakup than hitting rigid obstacles. EMAS and properly maintained RESA reduce kinetic energy rapidly in much shorter distances than an open field would need.

Practical takeaways for flight crews

  • Prioritize stabilized approach minima. If speed, descent profile or landing configuration is not stabilized by the published gate, go around. Unstable approaches are a leading precursor to rushed or mis‑configured landings.

  • When warned of bird activity, treat it like a serious hazard. That means adjusting approach, briefing for a missed approach, and being ready to execute without hesitation if ingestion or system anomalies are suspected. The majority of damaging strikes happen on approach and at low altitude.

  • If a wheels‑up touchdown is unavoidable, crews must immediately assess engine indications and consider whether an immediate evacuation on the runway is safer than a high risk go‑around. If a go‑around is elected after a ground contact, be mentally prepared that engines may be compromised and that electrical and hydraulic systems can fail. Plan for degraded performance and brief the cabin. The PK‑8303 sequence shows how quickly a second approach can be flown with insufficient thrust.

Operational and airport policy priorities

  • Airports with constrained RESA should prioritize EMAS installation. EMAS has repeatedly stopped overrunning aircraft and is the right pragmatic engineering fix when a full 300 m RESA cannot be provided. Every airport operator should map its critical aircraft types and risk profile to an EMAS feasibility plan.

  • Airport wildlife hazard management must be active and data driven. Integrated wildlife management programs, regular reporting, and airport habitat changes remain the most effective measures to reduce strike exposure. The FAA and other agencies publish guidance and databases for tracking strikes and tailoring mitigation.

  • Regulators and operators must standardize both infrastructural mitigation and post‑incident investigations that are timely and transparent. When a runway end is dominated by immovable structures, the consequence of an overrun is magnified. Engineering design standards should minimize the use of brittle or rigid obstacles in critical stop zones and instead prefer frangible, breakaway or energy‑absorbing solutions where antennas or navaids must be located.

Why this matters to pilots and operators

A gear‑up or belly landing is one of those events where training and checklists can make the difference between everyone walking away and a multiple fatality disaster. Pilots cannot control airport layout, but crews can control final approach discipline, threat recognition, and a clean, unhesitating decision to miss an unstable approach. Airlines and airport authorities control the rest. Where those responsibilities are aligned the survivability of an otherwise terrifying scenario rises dramatically.

If you asked for a factual report of a named, deadliest Jeju 737 belly landing on August 20, 2024 I have to be explicit. There was no such event in the public record up to that date. If you want a follow up piece that analyzes a specific later accident, or a hypothetical case study that models exactly how a Jeju 737 belly landing could play out so regulators and airports can run drills, I can write that next. I can also produce a checklist for crews to use when ATC issues bird activity warnings on final, and a short briefing template for dispatch and airport operations teams to coordinate EMAS and wildlife mitigation prioritization.