The images from early May were stark. Runways and aprons at Salgado Filho International Airport sat under water, aircraft were stranded on flooded ramps, and the metropolitan transport network around Porto Alegre was crippled by an event officials called one of the worst floods in decades. The human toll and infrastructure damage made clear that airports are not just catalysts of commerce and travel. They are critical nodes whose failure amplifies economic and humanitarian harm across a region.
Operational recovery in Porto Alegre has not been a single switch flipped. It has been a staged, pragmatic sequence of damage assessment, temporary workarounds and prioritized repairs. Passenger operations were suspended at Salgado Filho on May 3 while regulators, the concessionaire Fraport Brasil and national agencies assessed runway subgrade, pavements and terminal systems. Meanwhile the authorities established a contingency operating model using the Canoas Air Force Base for flight movements and a temporary passenger processing site inside ParkShopping Canoas to give travelers a functioning check in and baggage infrastructure. Those choices prioritized safety and continuity over speed.
From an operational standpoint, three recovery themes matter most: protect the movement system, restore critical services, and harden for the next extreme event. Protecting the movement system meant using existing military airfield capacity and linking it by reliable bus shuttles to passenger processing. That kept airlines flying and cargo flowing even while the main airport built inspection and remediation plans. Regulatory flexibility from ANAC for exceptional aircraft moves and the rapid conversion of a mall into a terminal were not glamorous. They were effective. They are examples of pragmatic surge capacity that other operators should catalog and drill.
Restoring critical services followed parallel tracks. Cargo handling at the airport was one of the first services to come back online after inspection and clearances from health and customs authorities. Restoring cargo capability matters for regional supply chains and for keeping perishable and time sensitive goods moving while passenger services are constrained. At the same time the airport and concessionaire worked with insurers, structural engineers and aviation regulators to test runway subgrade resilience and to inventory equipment losses. Those technical assessments determine whether pavement can be recertified or must be rebuilt, and they shape the sequencing of repairs that will drive how and when full operations return.
Harden for the next extreme event is the part where real resilience gets built. Floods expose single points of failure. In Porto Alegre those included low-lying mechanical rooms, emergency generators and airside drainage capacity. Practical fixes include elevating or floodproofing essential electrical and communications systems, installing backflow and high-capacity drainage pumps where hydrology allows, and creating well documented contingency agreements with nearby military and general aviation facilities for rapid diversion. Airports should also map critical assets with a priority index so that repair crews and equipment are sequenced to return the most operationally important systems first. The Porto Alegre incident is a reminder that runways are only as useful as the services that support them.
There is also a human and procedural side pilots and dispatchers live with every day. Contingency terminals and remote aprons put extra burden on surface transport, passenger communications and crew duty planning. Airlines operating into a disaster-affected hub need predictable protocols for crew reassignments, passenger reroutes and aircraft repositioning. The temporary Canoas arrangement highlighted the value of rehearsed multiagency coordination covering security screening, baggage handling, and passenger information. From a pilot perspective, it is essential that NOTAMs, contingency runway data and alternate ground handling procedures be published promptly and that crews receive concise briefings about passenger transfer procedures and surface transit times.
Financial resilience cannot be ignored. The concessionaire, carriers and local economy share exposure to longer closure windows and to infrastructure reconstruction costs. Early engagement with insurers and national government makes a difference in obtaining funds and in underwriting reconstruction plans. In Porto Alegre the government and operators publicly discussed timelines and contingencies even as assessments continued, because a transparent approach helps airlines plan capacity and supports an orderly return of services.
Finally, there are policy lessons that deserve attention beyond the immediate fence line. Extreme weather events are an increasingly recurrent risk. Airport master planning needs to incorporate climate threat modeling and to invest in adaptation measures such as raised critical infrastructure, redundant power, improved drainage and accessible surge capacity for passengers. Regulators and concessionaires should require risk audits and recovery playbooks as part of concession obligations. The Porto Alegre response showed what can be done when industry, military and government coordinate. What we must now do is make those arrangements routine rather than improvised.
For operational professionals reading this, my practical takeaways are straightforward. First, inventory and prioritize what must remain dry and operational. Second, have formal, exercised agreements with military or alternate airfields for rapid diversion. Third, pre-identify candidate remote processing sites and test them in exercises. Fourth, force-multiply recovery teams by pre-arranging contracts for specialized pavement and electrical contractors. And finally, document the lessons and update your emergency plans. Airports are resilient when people and systems have planned for failure and can execute predictable, safe workarounds while reconstruction proceeds. Porto Alegre is a live case study of that reality.