2024 has proven to be a stress test for American airspace policy. Reports of persistent unmanned aircraft system incursions, including well documented episodes over sensitive military and industrial sites, have exposed gaps in detection, attribution, and authorities. The operational reality is simple: we do not lack concern or ambition. We lack a harmonized legal and procedural framework that lets the right actor respond, quickly and lawfully, when an unmanned system shows up where it should not.
Two core problems keep repeating. First, detection and forensic attribution remain immature at the speeds and altitudes at which many of these systems operate. Trained observers and local police sometimes spot objects that national sensors miss or cannot track to a point of origin. That reality turns a tactical nuisance into a strategic headache when the incursions occur near high-value assets.
Second, the authorities available to respond are fragmented. The Department of Defense and NORAD recognize the scale of incursions across multiple domestic theaters, but Title 10 constraints and the need to coordinate with the FAA and civil authorities limit kinetic options on U.S. soil. What remains are ad hoc workarounds and slow, interagency consultations instead of a predictable, fast chain of action for commanders on the ground. The problem is not a lack of tools. The problem is a lack of clear, lawful lines of responsibility that match the risk environment.
The East Coast response so far reflects those constraints. Facilities from the Hampton Roads area to critical contractor sites have documented repeated suspicious UAS activity that required local security and federal attention. These incidents have prompted ad hoc deployments of detection equipment, outreach between base security and local law enforcement, and classified enquiries at higher levels. They have not, however, produced a stable operational playbook that all stakeholders understand and can execute without delay.
Regulatory tools like Remote ID establish an important baseline. Remote ID is effectively a digital license plate for drones and is now in effect for most operators. It gives FAA, law enforcement, and other agencies a way to identify compliant operations. That capability matters. But the Government Accountability Office has found that the FAA has not sufficiently equipped state and local law enforcement to use Remote ID as an investigative tool. Enforcement and information access remain uneven across jurisdictions. In short, the technology mandate exists. The on-the-ground utility of that mandate is still a work in progress.
From a legal viewpoint the remedy path is clear but politically fraught. Congress and executive agencies must do three things: clarify authorities, fund detection and attribution, and standardize interagency operating procedures. Clarified authorities means revising the narrow set of covered facilities and engagement thresholds so that commanders can act within the law when an unmanned aircraft poses a genuine safety or security risk. Funding means standing up a distributed detection and forensic network at ports, power plants, airports, and military installations so that sightings are not ephemeral anecdotes but verifiable events with a traceable signature. Standard operating procedures mean pre-authorized playbooks so that the FAA, DoD, DHS, FBI, state police, and local law enforcement execute complementary roles instead of waiting for direction.
Practical measures the East Coast should prioritize now are operational and legal. Operationally, invest in multi-sensor detection hubs with radar, RF, electro-optical and acoustic fusion. Field hardened data-sharing nodes that distribute curated leads to all civil and military partners in real time. Legally, adopt a narrow, risk-based expansion of “covered facility” authorities that preserves civil liberties and aviation safety while allowing rapid nonkinetic and, when justified, kinetic options inside a tightly constrained rule set. In plain terms, give commanders the ability to act, but only when preconditions for safety, oversight, and proportionality are met.
Policymakers must also fix the weakest link: information flow to local first responders. City police departments and sheriff offices are often the first to observe unusual UAS activity. If those partners cannot quickly pull Remote ID or RF records from the FAA, or if they cannot access validated detection feeds, the entire incident response becomes guesswork. The FAA and DHS should provide standard access protocols, training, and rapid legal channels so that local agencies can act on verified information rather than rumor.
Finally, do not confuse panic with policy. High profile incursions will generate political pressure to hastily expand military authorities or to allow unfettered countermeasures. That temptation must be resisted. Any expansion of authorities must be narrow, transparent, and accompanied by robust oversight and reporting. The goal is a legally sound, operationally effective posture that reduces risk without opening the door to mission creep or erosions of civil authority. The East Coast response to the 2024 peak must be evidence driven, legally defensible, and operationally realistic.
The moment calls for a measured sense of urgency. Lawmakers should accelerate hearings focused on harmonizing authorities and funding detection networks. Agencies should publish model interagency agreements and give local law enforcement practical tools and training. Industry should accelerate affordable, accredited detection and attribution products with certified data exports. If we get the legal framework and the data architecture right, what looks like an intractable problem today becomes a solvable mission tomorrow.