The European Union’s aviation safety toolkit increasingly operates at two levels. It can target an individual operator through an airline listing. It can also use state-focused measures, including refusal of Third Country Operator authorisations and, where concerns are systemic, a blanket prohibition on carriers certified in a given State. That duality is central to recent activity involving Tanzania and Suriname and it matters for regulators and operators worldwide.

The most concrete, recent development affecting East Africa came when the European Commission updated the EU Air Safety List to include Air Tanzania. The Commission’s December 2024 notification made clear that the decision responded to safety concerns identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and that the authority had decided not to grant Air Tanzania a TCO authorisation. That step illustrates how the EU combines agency technical findings with an administrative gatekeeping mechanism to prevent operations into EU airspace.

Suriname’s exposure in the EU framework is more historically layered. At the carrier level Blue Wing Airlines has been repeatedly addressed in the EU process because of verified safety deficiencies discovered through ramp inspections and accident follow up. Separately, the European institutions have engaged with the Surinamese regulator over the past several years, requesting documentation and convening technical meetings to assess the Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Suriname. Those interactions reflect the Commission’s preference for technical dialogue before escalating to broader measures.

Taken together these cases show several trends that practitioners need to acknowledge.

1) The EU is not shy about mixing technical assessment with administrative instruments. The Air Safety List operates alongside the TCO process and the Commission will deploy both. A finding by EASA that oversight or operational practices fall short of ICAO standards is often the trigger for administrative consequences that can include denial of access, refusal of TCOs, or listing on the Air Safety List. That is precisely the route used in the Air Tanzania case.

2) Engagement precedes escalation but timelines are finite. The EU routinely opens a technical dialogue with a State regulator. Where corrective action is not demonstrably effective in a reasonable period the policy response may harden into restrictions that affect commerce and connectivity. The record with Suriname shows the Commission and the Agency pursuing information and remote meetings prior to more forceful steps. Regulator engagement is necessary but it must produce measurable, auditable outcomes.

3) Multiple oversight tools coexist internationally and they are complementary rather than duplicative. The International Civil Aviation Organization’s USOAP Continuous Monitoring Approach remains the normative audit framework used to measure a State’s effective implementation of the eight critical elements. ICAO capacity development projects and targeted training can and do improve outcomes, as evidenced by technical assistance efforts reported for States including Tanzania. That is relevant because remedial work under ICAO processes is often the roadmap for delisting or for restoring an IASA or TCO status.

4) National and regional blacklists have real economic and reputational consequences even when operational disruption to EU schedules is limited. Many carriers listed by the EU do not currently fly to Europe, but the designation constrains commercial partnerships, leasing arrangements, insurance terms, and access to financing. That secondary market pressure is frequently what compels regulators and carriers to pursue corrective programmes. The U.S. FAA’s IASA programme is a parallel example. A downgrade there to Category 2 restricts route and codeshare expansion with U.S. carriers, a commercially impactful outcome that has driven reform in multiple States. Practitioners must therefore treat blacklists as regulatory reputational instruments with measurable market effects.

Policy implications and practical steps

For states and carriers seeking removal from a blacklist the path is technical and procedural, not political. Key priorities should include the following.

  • Prioritise demonstrable, auditable remediation against ICAO protocol questions. That requires documented legal and organisational reform, robust personnel licensing and training, and a sustained programme of surveillance and corrective action. ICAO USOAP processes remain the yardstick used by third parties.

  • Treat third party instruments like the EU TCO process and the FAA IASA rating as integral to market access strategy. Denial or downgrading is not only a safety signal but an access barrier. Early engagement with EASA, the Commission and the FAA can clarify expectations and shorten timelines for remediation.

  • Build transparency into oversight reforms. Regular public reporting of corrective milestones and results from ramp inspections, audit follow ups, and inspector training creates confidence. The EU and other stakeholders increasingly look for measurable implementation, not just commitments.

  • Leverage international capacity development funding and partnership projects to address competence gaps. ICAO projects and bilateral technical cooperation can be faster and more effective than ad hoc responses. Tanzania’s participation in capacity development initiatives demonstrates how targeted support can be marshalled once deficiencies are identified.

For EU policy makers and international partners there are complementary imperatives. The EU should maintain clarity about its criteria and the evidence it demands for delisting. That preserves the credibility of the list while giving States a predictable compliance path. International partners should view listings as an opportunity to coordinate technical assistance rather than only as punitive measures. When regulators align on remediation plans and verify results through ICAO mechanisms the outcome is safer skies and restored connectivity.

Conclusion

The Air Tanzania case and Suriname’s engagement with EU processes show how modern air safety governance blends technical audit, capacity building and administrative instruments. Blacklists are blunt when seen alone, but their real force comes from the commercial and diplomatic pressure they generate. For States and operators the correct response is technical, immediate and measurable. For the international community the moment calls for coordinated assistance that converts safety assessments into sustained implementation. That is the only viable route out of the blacklist cycle and back toward normalised global operations.