Clear operating picture first. As of May 13, 2025 there were no widely reported, confirmed incidents in the public record describing a hijacking of a Samaritan’s Purse aircraft out of Juba. Samaritan’s Purse was actively operating humanitarian programs in South Sudan in early 2025, and aviation — whether NGO, UNHAS, or chartered light aircraft — is the only practical way into many remote communities there.

That context matters because flying humanitarian missions into and out of Juba and the greater Upper Nile region is inherently different from operating on a published commercial route. The airfields are austere, security is fluid, surface routes are often impassable, and the only realistic options for timely delivery of medicines, vaccines, and staff are small turboprops and helicopters managed by NGOs, UNHAS, or local charter firms. The World Food Programme managed UNHAS provides that common-service airbridge for the humanitarian community and routinely operates into locations where commercial alternatives do not exist.

From a pilot and operations perspective the threat picture you should plan around falls into three buckets: unauthorized access and infiltration, misidentification or coercion inflight, and gaps in airside perimeter control and vetting on the ground.

  • Unauthorized access and infiltration. Small humanitarian aircraft load quickly and often carry staff plus light cargo. At uncontrolled or semi-controlled ramps it is feasible for an unauthorised person to board or hide in a cargo compartment if ramp and manifest procedures are relaxed. In conflict or displacement settings, desperation and opportunism raise that risk. UNHAS and other humanitarian aviation operators emphasize strict manifest control and shared procedures precisely because many destinations are otherwise unreachable.

  • Misidentification and coercion in flight. Single-engine and small twin turboprops are common for deep-field missions. Their fuel reserves, panic-handling characteristics, and limited diversion alternatives mean that if someone with a weapon or threat appears inflight the crew have few safe options. The best outcomes follow training in threat assessment, clear delegated authority to declare diversions early, and disciplined radio and ATC use to create options before fuel becomes critical.

  • Airside perimeter and document vulnerabilities. In fragile states forged documents, fake uniforms, and lax airside access can let armed or politically motivated individuals position themselves near aircraft. The aviation environment in South Sudan has required agile responses from both UN agencies and NGOs to keep air operations running while managing access risk. Where local security forces provide perimeter protection that can help, but it is not a substitute for operator-level controls on who gets on the airplane and how cargo is screened.

Immediate, practical measures for humanitarian operators and pilots

1) Manifest discipline and positive ID every flight. Treat every pax and every bag as a mission item. No exceptions. Signed manifests should be reconciled against boarding counts before push. If somebody appears who is not on the manifest, do not board them without an authorizing call from an agreed security contact. These steps are low cost and eliminate simple infiltration vectors.

2) Brief the crew on ‘no surprises’ diversion plan. Pilots must brief a single, executable plan for diversion when any threat appears. That plan should include the nearest safe airfield options, fuel minima that trigger diversion, and a single point of contact ashore to coordinate arrest or de-escalation. Make the call early. Turning toward a safe field while you still have fuel and options wins fights you cannot win in the last moments.

3) Lock down the ramp and cargo handling. Where possible, put ramp control in operator hands rather than leaving gate management to ad hoc local arrangements. If the operator cannot control the airside, do not accept cargo or pax that cannot be physically searched under your standard operating procedures. Use simple physical controls like seals and tamper-evident bags for high-value medical supplies.

4) Coordinate with UNHAS and the humanitarian security cell. UNHAS provides an established airbridge and operational norms that reduce duplication and risk. Where UNHAS serves a route, NGOs and faith-based organizations should use it when practicable because it centralises manifesting, security vetting, and flight following. Where UNHAS cannot serve a location, ensure your ops conform to the same safety checks UNHAS requires.

5) Equip for tracking and comms. Beyond a functioning ELT, carry robust two-way SATCOM or HF as a backup and a personal locator beacon for single-engine work. Real-time flight following reduces the time between an in-flight event and a coordinated ground response.

6) Train for verbal de-escalation and firm cockpit authority. The pilot-in-command must retain command. Simple de-escalation scripts, practiced with cabin staff, increase the odds that a crew can talk a suspect down or buy time to reach a diversion airport. If coercion is credible and there is no safe option, preserving life and landing to surrender is sometimes the least-bad outcome.

7) Pre-authorised diversion fields and fuel margins. Plan with higher fuel reserves than routine commercial minima. In South Sudan the availability of safe diversion fields can be limited by weather, security, and ground services. Pre-authorised fields where local authorities will accept a diversion without delay are a necessary piece of the risk picture.

Operational, organisational measures for humanitarian bosses and donors

  • Do not under-resource aviation safety. Humanitarian aviation is mission critical. Underfunded flights force shortcuts. Donors and headquarters must accept that proper vetting, ramp control, tracking, and spare capacity cost money and that those costs are part of mission delivery.

  • Standardise and audit local contractor practices. Many NGOs rely on local charters. Standardised safety audits, documentation checks, and minimum equipment lists reduce exposure to a contractor with poor security culture.

  • Use shared SOPs across NGOs. Where NGOs share routes, share manifests and a single point of contact for unexpected access decisions. A coordinated approach reduces the number of single-operator policy gaps that an opportunist can exploit. UNHAS exists to provide that common-service model where possible.

Closing takeaway

Flying humanitarian missions into and out of Juba and into South Sudan’s remote states is necessary work and it is high risk in ways that differ from routine commercial aviation. The best mitigations are procedural and organisational: strict manifest control, preplanned diversions, disciplined ramp control, use of UNHAS when available, robust comms and flight following, and donor acceptance that aviation risk management is a non-negotiable line item. Those are the measures that save crews, cargo, and lives on the ground.