I fly for a living and I read safety the way some people read the morning weather. When senior officials climb into military helicopters that were built for utility missions rather than executive transport it is not political theater it is a risk calculation. Ghana’s military inventory has long included Mi-8 and Mi-17 family rotorcraft used across transport and utility roles.
That fact matters because military rotary wing fleets and civilian VIP transport have different procurement, maintenance and operational cultures. Military crews operate under mission-first imperatives. That is compatible with national security tasks but it creates predictable gaps when the same aircraft are tasked to carry ministers and other high value passengers without civilian-level safeguards in place. The International Institute for Strategic Studies data and fleet listings make clear Mi-8/17 variants remain a workhorse for many air arms.
From the cockpit perspective the common failure modes are straightforward. Aging rotorcraft increase inspection time and component replacement demand. Availability of manufacturer-approved spare parts, documented maintenance history and properly certified overhauls are non negotiable if you want predictable reliability. When spare parts have to be improvised or cannibalized from other airframes the probability of latent failures rises. Independent audits and state safety oversight programs exist for a reason. ICAO assistance programs and safety projects aimed at AFI states show that bolstering oversight and accident investigation capacity is an ongoing, multiyear process across the region. Ghana participates in regional programs to strengthen oversight and investigation capacity.
Operationally there are preventable human factors as well. Do the pilots assigned to ministerial flights have specific VIP transport currency and SOPs? Are they flying under operational pressures to meet tight political timetables in marginal weather? Mission pressure, inadequate crew rest, or flying into unfamiliar helipads without a formal risk assessment and landing zone survey are familiar contributors to accidents worldwide. Past crashes of government or diplomatic flights underscore the stakes. The 2015 Pakistan Mi-17 crash that killed foreign envoys in the Naltar Valley was attributed to a mechanical loss of control during landing sequence, showing how even experienced crews and well intentioned missions can end badly when equipment or environmental factors are adverse.
There are three systemic safety gaps I see when military helicopters routinely carry political principals.
1) Fragmented oversight and unclear accountability. Military aircraft often fall under defense ministry regulation while transport of civilians triggers civil aviation safety expectations. Where those two systems are not harmonized the safety net has holes. ICAO projects in the region aim to raise investigation and oversight capacity but military flights are commonly excluded from civil oversight. That creates opacity around maintenance records, accident reporting and corrective action.
2) Maintenance and supply chain fragility. Legacy Russian designs like the Mi-8 family can be robust and forgiving. They also rely on supply lines, skilled overhaul facilities and careful component tracking to remain safe. Without a sustainable spares pipeline and quality-assured maintenance the risk climbs. Published fleet inventories show continued dependency on these airframes across multiple African nations which amplifies demand for parts and specialist maintenance.
3) Mission packaging and risk tolerance. VIP missions are political. That creates incentives to accept risk: fly in marginal weather, depart before full preflight inspections are complete, or compress crew rest cycles. Those human and organizational pressure points are where policy must step in with clear red lines. European military VIP guidance and established ground operations manuals provide practical checklists and procedures that should be adapted to national contexts. Those documents codify SSRs and preflight actions that make VIP carriage safer.
What would I advise, practically and without waiting for political cover? First, formalize VIP transport standards that apply whenever the travelling party includes non military personnel. That means minimum airworthiness baselines, documented maintenance provenance for the specific airframe, and a requirement for a signed flight risk assessment before acceptance. Second, create a standing agreement that ministers and heads of state travel on civil certified VIP platforms whenever feasible. Where military aircraft must be used, require an independent airworthiness audit and use of crews specifically trained and current in transport and VVIP protocols. Third, publish transparently the policies for ministerial air travel. Openness is not an act of political weakness. It forces the process to run through checklists rather than improvisation.
At the operational level implement simple mitigations that matter every flight. Require stabilized approach minima and deny landing if visibility or winds exceed published limits. Institute mandatory briefings that include crew rest status, maintenance anomalies, and alternate evacuation plans. Ensure every government flight carries functioning emergency locator transmitters and, where practicable, flight recorders appropriate to the aircraft mission profile. Build a SAR exercise program that exercises rapid civil military coordination so that if the worst happens the response is practiced and fast.
None of these are exotic. They are procedural, administrative and cultural. Europe and NATO partner manuals already describe how to handle VIP logistics while maintaining safety. Adapting those procedures to Ghanaian realities will take political will not invention.
Finally, learn from history. When sovereigns and ambassadors have been lost in reasonably routine flights the commonalities are predictable: aging equipment, logistical shortcuts, and pressure to complete the mission. The Naltar tragedy is a sobering reminder that diplomats and ministers are not immune to those same error chains. Treat ministerial flights as safety critical operations and build defense to civil handoffs that prioritize predictable, auditable safety. That will be less dramatic than headlines but it will save lives and keep governance functioning when it is needed most.
If Ghana is to keep using capable but aging helicopters for government transport it should do so with civilian standard checks, clear rules, and published accountability. That is how you reduce risk in the hardest place to afford mistakes: while moving your political leadership.