If a Colombian UH-60 Black Hawk were to be brought down by a dissident surface-to-air weapon, it would not be an isolated tactical failure. It would reveal gaps in force protection, intelligence, and air-domain risk management that pilots and planners can realistically close only with focused training, modest kit changes, and better ground-sensor integration.

Colombia fields a large Black Hawk fleet across the military and national police, and those helicopters are workhorses for troop transport, medical evacuation, and counternarcotics missions. That means they operate low and slow in contested, remote terrain where ground threats concentrate.

Operational context matters. Dissident groups and criminal militias have been active and violent across multiple coca-producing regions in 2025, producing frequent ground engagements and ambushes that complicate air operations. That security environment increases the likelihood that adversaries will try to attack aircraft involved in eradication, insertion, or medevac missions.

The historical problem of MANPADS and shoulder-fired SAMs in the region is well documented. Insurgent groups in Colombia have long sought these systems and illicit regional stockpiles exist in neighboring states, making acquisition a persistent risk vector. Put bluntly, the commodity is valuable and the demand from nonstate actors is established.

Threat vectors are predictable and recoverable. The highest risk windows for a helicopter are takeoff, approach, landing, and hovering at low altitude for troop insertion or external load work. A MANPADS operator needs line of sight, a short exposure window, and basic training to be effective. That is why standard mitigations work: compress the exposure window, deny predictable LZs, use terrain-masking where possible, and employ escorts and suppression when intelligence indicates heightened risk.

Technical mitigations matter too. Modern aircraft survivability equipment such as missile warning systems, directional infrared countermeasures, and improved flare/chaff dispensing significantly reduce MANPADS effectiveness when fitted and used properly. Equipping Black Hawks with warning suites and training aircrews to respond immediately to a missile warning should be a priority for units routinely operating in contested zones. Those are not perfect solutions, but they shift odds in favor of the aircrew.

Unmanned systems change the calculus. Since 2024, battlefield use of first-person-view and kamikaze drones has demonstrated that small, low-cost UAS can threaten rotary wing aircraft during the vulnerable landing and hover phases. Tactics that evolved in other theaters show insurgents adapt commercial gear into weapons against helicopters. Colombia must factor that asymmetric threat into LZ planning and countermeasures.

Practical cockpit and crew-level procedures I would press immediately:

  • Treat every operation over coca-producing or contested terrain as a contested-aerodrome mission. Conduct full briefs that include likely ground weapon types and likely ambush points.
  • Fly unpredictable approach and departure profiles when terrain and load allow. Avoid straight-in approaches that become a magnet for prepared teams.
  • Use armed escort or armed overwatch when inserting or extracting teams in known hotspots. Overwatch need not be organic to the ship; remotely piloted aircraft or ground observers can provide timely warnings.
  • Train for immediate execution of countermeasure drills on a confirmed missile warning. Muscle memory wins time and lives.
  • Harden and rehearse LZ security with ground units. The best defensive countermeasure is a properly secured landing zone.

At the force and policy level, the following steps are urgent:

  • Prioritize fielding missile warning and countermeasure kits on helicopters that routinely fly in contested areas. The hardware is mature and the doctrine for use is clear.
  • Expand ground-based intelligence fusion. If dissidents are active in a sector, the air tasking order should reflect that with stricter approvals and risk mitigation requirements. The kind of small-unit violence recorded in 2025 underscores this need.
  • Harden and secure regional stockpiles and ports of entry. Historical reporting on regional MANPADS inventories underlines why stopping leakage at source is a national and regional security priority. International cooperation and stockpile security programs work if resourced.
  • Accelerate counter-UAS capabilities for bases and forward operating locations. Drones are a newer but proven method to harass and, in some theaters, to damage rotary-wing aircraft. A layered approach of detection, electronic defeat, and physical interdiction is required.

Finally, pilots and commanders need simple, actionable doctrine that matches the threat set. Procedures should be risk-based and mission specific. The main point is this: a downed UH-60 would be the symptom, not the disease. The disease is predictability, poor integration between air and ground intelligence, and underinvestment in survivability and counter-UAS measures. Those problems are solvable with a mix of training, kit, and better intelligence fusion.

A Black Hawk loss to a dissident SAM or an adapted drone would be tragic. It should also be an operational wake-up call. Fix the basics first, then layer the technology. From a pilot’s perspective, those fixes are familiar, affordable, and effective when done consistently.