The An-22 was never meant to be graceful. It was a workhorse of brute capability built to move outsized loads and to operate where runways and support were minimal. For the last year and a half the type trickled out of service until, by mid 2025, the type’s operational role in Russia had effectively ended as the remaining airframes were withdrawn and put into storage or museum custody.
From an operator perspective the end was predictable. The An-22’s NK-12 turboprops and complex contra rotating props are marvels of engineering but they are also unique. Production lines closed decades ago. Overhaul capability for key components has been inconsistent. The practical result was heavy reliance on cannibalization of parked airframes and bespoke repair work to keep any An-22 flying. That maintenance friction, plus competing priorities to keep An-124s and Il-76s mission ready, made continued operational sustainment increasingly uneconomical.
There were clear signposts. Russia’s military transport command signalled the type would be retired, and observers logged the last known ferry and museum moves in 2024 and early 2025. Photographs and reporting captured the flight of RF-09309 away from Migalovo in August 2024 and later mentions place the final airframes in storage or on display at Ural facilities by spring 2025. Those are not dramatic crash headlines. They are the administrative end of an era. For crews who flew them, the An-22’s final flights were quiet and practical: ferry, preserve, park.
Operationally this leaves real capability questions. The An-22 offered a mix of reach, payload and rough field ability that neither Il-76 variants nor the smaller tactical transports match. The An-124 and its D-18T engines fill some heavy lift roles but have their own supply chain constraints and production gaps. That puts pressure on planners to prioritize what loads get moved by air and where; it pushes some missions back to sea or road transport and it creates a vulnerability for rapid strategic lift. In short, losing An-22 capability narrows military and humanitarian options when the scenario calls for a single large lift platform to carry outsized cargo into austere locations.
From a safety and logistics viewpoint the takeaways are practical. Preserve technical data and spare parts to support any remaining legacy types. Build transparent maintenance records and triage remaining airframes to retain a parts pool rather than leaving everything to corrosion. If governments want a sovereign heavy-lift capability they must fund a clear path to replacement aircraft, including industrial partnerships for engines and airframe components. For operators and airspace managers, the immediate need is to map capability against demand and to plan for longer runway and ground-support needs when outsized loads can no longer rely on a short field turboprop lifter. The An-22’s retirement is less a single dramatic event and more a capability transition that should be managed with the same operational detail pilots and loadmasters used when they planned an An-22 sortie.