The National Transportation Safety Board has opened a focused window on one of the hardest practical problems in terminal-area flying: mixing fast, fixed wing arrivals with low, maneuverable helicopters over a congested river corridor. The agency released the investigative hearing agenda this week and will convene a three-day fact-finding proceeding that includes a dedicated panel on collision‑avoidance technology.

The case under scrutiny is the Jan. 29, 2025 mid‑air collision between a PSA Airlines CRJ700 on final approach to Runway 33 at Reagan Washington National and a U.S. Army UH‑60 Black Hawk transiting a published helicopter corridor over the Potomac. The accident killed all on both aircraft and forced hard questions about how we separate dissimilar traffic types in a tight terminal environment.

From a pilot point of view the technology conversation breaks into two practical threads: what the aircraft carry and what the system around the aircraft does. Onboard systems include transponders, Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS, also called ACAS), and ADS‑B Out and In. Ground and ANSP tools include terminal radar, automated alerts in air traffic control systems, and multilateration or ADS‑B receiver networks that provide traffic picture to controllers and to surveillance services. None of these is a magic bullet; each has operational limits you can run into in the DCA environment.

Helicopters routinely operate at low altitudes, under or between terminal radar sweeps, and sometimes with transponders turned to limited modes for operational reasons. That makes them less visible to some surveillance and to certain collision‑avoidance functions tuned for airplane traffic. The NTSB has already highlighted a history of proximity alerts and close calls in the DCA area and urged restrictions on helicopter operations when certain runways are in use. Those recommendations directly touch the surveillance gap problem.

ADS‑B Out gives a precise, continual position broadcast that is enormously helpful for controllers and for aircraft equipped to receive it. ADS‑B In and other datalink receiving capabilities bring that picture into the cockpit so crews can see non‑transponder traffic that radar might miss. But legacy military practice and some mission profiles have left portions of the rotary wing fleet without ADS‑B broadcasting, or operating with the ability to switch it off for security reasons. The NTSB inquiry and immediate FAA actions since the accident have focused on closing that gap, at least in the congested airspace immediately around the airport.

A second, practical limit is human factors. Collision‑avoidance tools are only useful if crews and controllers receive timely, credible alerts and respond to them in a way that fits the airplane handling and the traffic geometry. The NTSB agenda shows panels on air data systems, altimeters, and training for DCA air traffic control. Those agenda items signal that the board is not treating the event as only a single equipment failure but as a system problem that includes procedures, training, and culture.

An important complicating factor that the hearing may probe further is electromagnetic interference and spectrum management. Earlier in 2025, testing of counter‑drone technology by federal agencies near Reagan Washington National produced false cockpit alerts and other traffic alert anomalies. That episode underlined how civilian and security activities in shared spectrum can cause operational confusion in flight decks and at ATC consoles. Any plan to mandate or retrofit collision‑avoidance systems needs to be matched with stricter controls on testing and spectrum use in terminal areas.

What should operators and regulators be looking at during and after the hearing? From an operational, pilot‑centric view the list is short and tactical:

  • Require universal ADS‑B Out in the congested special flight rules area, with narrowly defined, transparent exceptions for verified national security operations and an agreed oversight process for any waivers. The immediate safety benefit of consistent position broadcasts in mixed traffic is large.
  • Equip aircraft that routinely transit the DCA corridor with ADS‑B In or compatible traffic display tools so crews see all cooperative targets, not just those picked up on TCAS. That reduces surprise in mixed operations.
  • Improve terminal surveillance with a mix of radar, multilateration, and ground ADS‑B receivers to fill coverage gaps at low altitude. Controllers need a single integrated traffic picture they can trust during peaks.
  • Harden policies on spectrum use and formalize coordination for any counter‑UAS or other emissions tests near terminal areas. False alerts in a cockpit are not a hypothetical risk.
  • Tighten route design and timing separations for helicopter corridors when busy runways are in use, and codify those restrictions so operational exceptions are rare and auditable. The NTSB has already recommended route changes and limits; doing the procedural work will be slow but necessary.

Technology changes will matter, but the immediate returns are often procedural. ADS‑B hardware installs are time and money, but the quicker wins are unambiguous rules that eliminate visual separation ambiguities, standardize required broadcasts, and make testing activity transparent. The hearing schedule indicates the board will examine both the tech and the human side. How the military balances operational security with the need to broadcast positions in one of the busiest terminal areas in the country will be a central tension to watch.

I will be watching the hearing panels on collision‑avoidance technologies and ATC procedures closely. Pilots and operators need concrete steps that are enforceable and measurable. If hearings become theater without clear timelines for implementing NTSB recommendations, the same structural weaknesses will remain. This inquiry is an opportunity to fix the practical pieces that keep mixed traffic safe: uniform position broadcasting, robust low‑altitude surveillance, disciplined spectrum use, and clear, enforced procedures for route and altitude compliance. Those fixes are not glamorous, but they are the ones that save lives.