There are two facts aircrews and planners in Colombia live with today. First, non state armed groups in the region have sought and in some cases possessed man portable surface to air systems. Second, Colombia still relies heavily on low and medium altitude aviation for counternarcotics work: helicopter insertion, aerial reconnaissance, and light fixed wing surveillance remain the backbone of interdiction and eradication missions. Those two facts together create an operational problem that needs blunt, pilot level solutions as well as policy fixes.
The historical record is straightforward. The FARC and later dissident elements have pursued shoulder fired missiles and other anti aircraft weapons for decades. There are documented captures and at least one publicly available video from the last decade showing a shoulder fired launcher in guerrilla hands. That historical precedent is important because it shows intent and capability to attempt attacks on low flying aircraft. Counterair patrols must assume the threat exists in contested rural airspace.
Regional proliferation matters. Stockpiles and loose inventories in neighboring states raise the risk that MANPADS and launchers will leak into illicit markets. Intelligence and interdiction are essential, but they take time. In the meantime aircrews are the last line of defense. That means the Air Force, National Police aviation units, and army aviation elements must treat narcotics patrols as contested flights when operating in areas where organized armed groups or trafficking networks operate.
From an operational perspective there are three practical measures flight crews and mission planners should prioritize immediately.
1) Tactics first. Avoid predictability in routing and timing. Use terrain masking where it does not compromise mission objectives, fly higher for transit where sensors allow it, and minimize time spent at low altitude over suspect zones. When low level flight is required, coordinate with ground units to provide suppression or early warning. These are operational tradeoffs pilots understand. No amount of armor alone will make a pattern safe. (Operational recommendation, no external citation.)
2) Passive and active survivability. Fit aircraft used routinely on narcotics patrols with ballistic protection for critical areas and crew. Retrofit door and cockpit areas with certified armor panels, upgrade seats to blast and fragmentation tolerant designs, and fit armored windows where mission geometry allows. Add basic pilot wearable protection and enforce it. Where budgets permit, install countermeasure systems and missile approach warning sensors on higher risk platforms. These measures reduce vulnerability but they are not magic. They buy seconds and increase the chance of recovery after a hit. (Technical upgrades as practical measures.)
3) ISR and layered detection. Expand the use of persistent sensors, long endurance ISR and over the horizon detection tools to push the detection envelope away from aircraft. Relocatable radars, tethered aerostats, and improved human intelligence networks give airborne crews time to avoid or mitigate threats. Where possible, use stand off collection to find and fix launch sites prior to manned flights. Investment in detection is also a force multiplier for ground interdiction. (Doctrinal recommendation supported by counterair principles.)
Policy choices matter as much as hardware. Colombia and international partners should prioritize securing and destroying vulnerable MANPADS stockpiles, improving arms controls at borders, and targeting trafficking networks that traffic both drugs and weapons. Intelligence fusion between counternarcotics and defense agencies must be routine rather than episodic. Without that, armor and countermeasures are tactical bandages on a strategic problem.
Finally, from a pilot’s point of view the ethics and reality of the mission must be acknowledged. Many counternarcotics flights involve crews exposed to risk in service of a broader public good. Commanders must be honest with crews about the threat environment, provide the best available equipment and training, and limit unnecessary exposure. Investing in avoidance and detection reduces the requirement to expose crews to direct kinetic threats. Where exposure is unavoidable, hardening the platform and practicing casualty evacuation and recovery drills are non negotiable. (Operational culture and leadership point.)
Colombia has a long institutional memory of aerial threats in internal conflict. That memory should guide practical, layered adaptation now. Armor helps. So does flares or missile warning systems when they are feasible. The real fix is to combine smarter tactics, better detection, targeted arms control and a steady program of protection upgrades so that narcotics patrols are not routinely flying into unmitigated threats. The work is operational and political at once. If I had one piece of advice for crews and fleet managers it would be this: assume the MANPADS threat, plan to avoid it, prepare to survive it, and work to remove the threat from the field permanently.