As of 25 September 2025 there is no record in major safety databases or media of an “Emirates HKG vehicle strike” involving an aircraft landing at Hong Kong. I checked the Aviation Safety Network’s database and found no entry matching that description prior to that date. That matters because it changes how we discuss risk. We are not reviewing an incident report here but laying out the operational facts pilots and airport operators need to know about vehicle strike risk and the set of landing and runway alerting tools that are supposed to reduce it.

Short version for crews: “landing alerts” can mean several different systems. At some airports landing alerts are automated visual cues that warn aircrews that the runway is occupied. Examples include Runway Status Light systems which provide autonomous red lights to indicate it is unsafe to land, enter, or take off. Other systems, collectively part of an Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System or A-SMGCS, give tower and ground operators a consolidated surface picture so they can detect vehicles near active runways and issue warnings. None of these systems replace ATC but they add independent layers of situational awareness.

How those systems work in practice and where they have limits

  • Runway Status Lights and FAROS style alerts. RWSL-type systems derive traffic position from surface surveillance, then automatically illuminate runway entrance or takeoff hold lights and in some designs flash approach lights to indicate an occupied runway. They give a direct, unambiguous visual cue to flight crews and vehicle drivers without waiting for ATC. They are an effective last-mile layer but they require accurate surface surveillance and correct system integration. False negatives are possible when a target has no transponder or the surveillance feed is interrupted.

  • A-SMGCS and ground radar. A-SMGCS aggregates multilateration, surface radar, ADS-B, and vehicle transponder data to build a live surface picture for tower and safety systems. It is a controller and operations tool first, but it supports automated alerts and post-event review. Its performance is driven by sensor coverage and vehicle equipage. Where vehicle transponders or tagging are not universal, A-SMGCS can miss a fast-moving ground target outside the normal movement area.

  • Human factors and operations. Alerts are only useful if people know how to respond. Pilots are trained to follow ATC clearances and to react to RWSL when it contradicts a clearance. Ground vehicle operators often work for security, maintenance, or contractors and may lack the same level of runway-incursion training as airside operations staff. Coordination protocols, briefings, and strict limits on permissive patrols near runways are mandatory to make automated alerts meaningful.

Practical failure modes that could produce a vehicle strike on landing

  • Perimeter patrols or contractors operating outside official movement areas without transponder/tagging or without real-time coordination with ATC or airport ops.
  • Surveillance blind spots at low approach angles or where fence lines, terrain, or service roads bring vehicles close to runway safety areas.
  • Misinterpretation or noncompliance by vehicle drivers to visual or radio warnings, especially at night or during degraded weather.
  • System integration faults where surveillance inputs (radar, multilateration, ADS-B) are inconsistent or degraded, delaying or preventing automated alerts from triggering.

Actionable checklist for airlines and flight crews

1) Briefing and mental model: On arrival brief include a short line about the runway status system in use at destination when you know it. If the airport uses RWSL or FAROS, call it out so both pilots share the expectation of autonomous cues. If you do not know, assume no autonomous runway-occupied alert will appear.

2) Stabilized approach discipline: The final defense against any unexpected runway hazard is a stabilized approach. If the approach is unstable, plan a go-around early. A go-around buys time and prevents committing to a touchdown where a last-second alert or sighting would require an emergency maneuver. (This is plain pilotcraft but worth repeating.)

3) Use ATC readbacks as early warning: If tower mentions vehicle activity, treat it as actionable intelligence. If you see unusual lights or movement near the runway, query tower immediately and be prepared to go around.

4) Report anything unusual: If you encounter ambiguous or late-arriving landing alerts, file a short, specific report via your safety reporting system and notify OCC so airline operations and airport authorities can reconcile system logs with your report.

Recommendations for airports and regulators

  • Equip persistent perimeter patrols with transponders or vehicle tags that feed into A-SMGCS and RWSL feeds. Without airside tagging, a vehicle just beyond the fence is invisible to automated runsheet logic. Target equipage should be mandatory for any vehicle that patrols near runways or safety areas.

  • Tighten operational windows for unescorted patrols. If a security or maintenance vehicle must attend the perimeter, require positive coordination with airport operations and, where possible, a vehicle escort or temporary suspension of runway activity.

  • Invest in integrated, redundant surveillance. Surface radar plus multilateration plus ADS-B gives the best chance that a vehicle or suface target will be detected. Add CCTV analytics and perimeter intrusion detection for non-transponder targets.

  • Train vehicle operators to the same radio and response standards expected of airside crews. Lights and automated cues are worthless if vehicle drivers do not understand their meaning or hierarchy relative to ATC clearances.

Concluding note for operations folks

If you prefer plain talk: landing alerts are a safety aid not a magic shield. Pilots must fly predictable, stabilized approaches. Airports must stop assuming perimeter patrols cannot become a hazard. Where automated alerts exist, operators must make sure every vehicle that can approach a runway shows up on the surveillance picture. That combination of conservative flying, better vehicle equipage, and robust surface surveillance is the only practical path to preventing a vehicle strike during a landing.