San Diego Six Fatal: Controlled Flight Into Terrain?

The crash of a Cessna Citation S/II (N666DS) into the Murphy Canyon neighborhood in San Diego left six people aboard dead and several on the ground injured. The aircraft was on an instrument approach to Montgomery-Gibbs Executive Airport (MYF) in heavy night fog when it struck power transmission lines and impacted a residential area about 1.6 nautical miles from the runway displaced threshold. Investigators moved quickly to secure wreckage and begin a formal NTSB inquiry.

The preliminary NTSB findings make this a textbook scenario for asking whether this was a controlled flight into terrain or something different. ADS-B and radar traces show the airplane crossed the final approach fix descending through published altitudes, and the data stream ended at roughly 464 feet mean sea level, about 60 feet above ground level, shortly before the first identified point of contact with power lines some 90 to 95 feet above the ground. In short, the airplane was well below where it should have been on a stabilized instrument approach when it hit obstacles.

Complicating the approach environment were two critical ground-side outages. The NTSB reported that the airport had a long standing outage for the runway alignment indicator lights associated with the MALSR approach lighting system; that condition dated back to March 28, 2022 and was noted in a NOTAM. Separately, the airport automated surface observing system was inoperative at the time of the accident following a power surge. Air traffic control provided weather from Miramar about 4 miles away, but the pilot acknowledged the ASOS outage. The preliminary report also documents that, on final, the pilot keyed his microphone seven times consistent with attempting to activate pilot controlled lighting. Those are important operational details when you are flying an instrument approach into low visibility at night.

The radio transcript cited by the NTSB shows the pilot and controller discussed divert options for a missed approach, yet the pilot responded earlier in the descent that, “I think we’ll be alright.” That decision to continue, and the subsequent descent below published minimum crossing altitudes, illustrates two recurring human factors we see in these accidents. One is continuation bias, where a pilot committed to landing will press on despite deteriorating cues. The other is the hazards of single-pilot operations in complex jets at night and in IMC, especially when ground-based visual cues and reliable automated weather reporting are absent. The preliminary report notes the pilot had an FAA exemption allowing single-pilot operation of that aircraft type.

From a CFIT perspective the elements line up in a worrying way. Controlled flight into terrain is defined by an airworthy aircraft, under positive control, flown into terrain or an obstacle without awareness on the part of the crew. Here we have an aircraft on an instrument approach that descended below published minima while still being flown, contacted obstacles well below the safe profile and impacted terrain in IMC. Absent evidence of catastrophic system failure prior to the descent, those facts are consistent with CFIT as a plausible mode of accident. That said, the NTSB preliminary report does not assign a cause and investigators are still analyzing CVR and FADEC downloads, wreckage, and human factors. Final determinations will await the board’s final report.

Operational takeaways for pilots and operators are immediate and practical. First, if airport approach lighting or weather systems are unreliable, treat the destination as degraded and plan concrete alternates before descent. Second, stabilized approach criteria must be enforced: if you do not have the required visual references at or above the published minima, execute a missed approach without hesitation. Third, single-pilot operations in jets increase workload; operators should evaluate when a second pilot is a prudent risk mitigation, especially for night IMC flights into airports with known outages. Finally, from an airport and regulator perspective, prolonged outages of approach lighting are not academic. If lighting repairs are delayed by paperwork or environmental studies, a risk mitigation plan must be visible to the flying public and explicitly communicated to local operators.

This crash is a reminder that CFIT is not just an old problem of the jet age. It remains a frontline risk any time people choose to continue an approach without required visual cues and without the full complement of ground or aircraft-based guidance. The NTSB preliminary report gives us clear data points: descent below crossing altitudes, approach lighting out of service for years, ASOS inoperative, an attempted pilot activation of lighting, and impact with transmission lines at low altitude. Those facts point toward a controlled flight into terrain scenario as a working hypothesis, pending the NTSB’s final analysis.

As investigators work through cockpit audio, engine control downloads, and wreckage examination, the aviation community should treat this event as both a tragedy and a learning opportunity. The families and the neighborhood suffered real loss. The remaining task is to translate these early findings into improved procedures, clearer NOTAM processes, and better risk management so pilots do not find themselves flying a functioning airplane into obstacles that ought to have been avoided by planning and by conservative decision making.