The Transportation Safety Board of Canada has opened an investigation into the loss of control at liftoff and overturn of a DHC-2 Beaver departing Saint-Mathias Water Aerodrome. The preliminary occurrence record shows the float-equipped aircraft struck the water during the takeoff run, the right wing separated and the airplane overturned. One of the two occupants was fatally injured and the other sustained minor injuries. The occurrence was recorded as an active investigation A25Q0051.

That short factual summary is cold comfort for pilots who fly floats. The TSB record also notes that the emergency locator transmitter did not activate, an important operational and survivability detail that will shape the final safety findings and recommendations.

What to watch for while the investigation continues

  1. Surface hazards and vessel interaction. Water aerodromes are shared spaces. Boat wakes, fast-moving small craft, and changing surface conditions are common causal factors in seaplane loss-of-control events. The TSB has previously identified boat wake encounters during takeoff as a direct cause of loss of control and overturning in a separate investigation in Tofino. That occurrence underlines how a transient wake or unexpected wave can upset a seaplane at a critical moment during acceleration and rotation.

  2. Takeoff technique and porpoising risk. Floatplanes have a narrow margin between a stable planing climb and porpoising or porpoise-induced loss of control. How the pilot manages power, back-pressure, and directional control during the transition from displacement to planing and then to airborne flight is fundamental. When a wingtip or float contacts the water at speed the resulting asymmetric load can quickly shear attachments or roll the aircraft. The initial facts in the Saint-Mathias occurrence are consistent with a loss of roll control during the liftoff run.

  3. Equipment and survivability systems. The ELT not activating in this occurrence raises two concerns. First, an inactive ELT degrades the speed and likelihood of search and rescue activation following a capsizing. Second, it invites scrutiny of ELT installation and survivability in seaplane operations. Investigators will examine mounting, G-switch performance, water intrusion, and whether the unit met the practical needs of floatplane environments.

Operational implications for seaplane pilots and operators

  • Pre-takeoff surface scan. Before committing to a takeoff, perform a deliberate surface inspection along the intended run that includes not just static obstacles but expected vessel traffic and potential wake sources. If traffic is present, delay the takeoff until a clear run is confirmed.

  • Use of comms and visual alerts. Where a common traffic advisory frequency or local VHF channel is used, announce intentions and, when practical, request that local marine users avoid transiting the takeoff lane. Published guidance and local practice vary but the goal is simple. Reduce the probability of encountering boat wakes during the takeoff segment. The aviation community must treat water aerodromes as shared operational spaces and actively coordinate with marine users. FAA guidance and pilot information highlight the need to understand vessel right-of-way and to keep clear of maritime traffic while on the water.

  • Conservative rotation and climb planning. Adjust rotation technique and climb profile to the prevailing water state and wind. If the run is rough or there is suspected conflicting marine traffic, accept a longer run to accelerate safely to climb speed rather than an early rotation that risks wing or float contact. Training syllabi should emphasize recognition and recovery from porpoising and step-taxi handling.

  • ELT and survivability checks. Operators must verify ELT functionality as part of preflight checks and consider ELT models and installations proven in watery environments. Personal locator beacons, life jackets worn during critical phases, and clear cockpit procedures for ditching or capsizing should be standard operating practice for commercial and charter float operations.

  • Record keeping and local aerodrome information. One recurrent deficiency with many water aerodromes is the lack of stable, published local information. Where possible, operators and aerodrome managers should maintain and publish guidance about typical vessel traffic patterns, recommended takeoff headings, and any seasonal hazards. ICAO regional guidance and many state-level documents recommend providing this kind of operational information because water aerodromes tend to change with tides, currents, and human activity.

What policymakers and aerodrome managers should press on now

  • Improve coordination between marine and aviation stakeholders at busy water aerodromes. Simple measures such as a radio-activated strobe for high traffic periods, marine notices, or a jointly managed advisory channel can materially reduce risky interactions. ICAO guidance and regional water aerodrome material support these measures.

  • Reassess ELT regulatory guidance and equipment suitability for float operations. The Saint-Mathias preliminary record makes clear that an ELT non-activation in a capsizing has consequences for rescue. Regulators and manufacturers should examine ELT survivability, water activation, and alternatives or supplements such as mandatory PLBs for passengers on commercial float flights.

  • Training emphasis and recurrent checks. Regulators and operators should require recurrent training that specifically covers water-specific aerodynamics, porpoise recognition and recovery, and low-speed water handling. The operational environment for seaplanes differs markedly from paved runway operations and the training syllabi must reflect that reality.

Why the aviation community should pay attention now

The Saint-Mathias occurrence is a sober reminder that the water environment adds variables that are different from land aerodromes. The TSB investigation will determine the definitive sequence and causal factors. While it is important not to pre-empt a formal report, the combination of a liftoff roll upset, wing strike, and ELT non-activation points to a cluster of operational and equipment risks that we as pilots can address today. The Tofino case examined by the TSB shows how a single wake or wave can rapidly escalate into a catastrophic upset. Both investigators and operators should treat these cases as a pattern to be interrupted through better surface management, clearer aerodrome information, and focused pilot training.

Practical checklist items for pilots to adopt immediately

  • Do a full water run prior to committing. Visual sweep both shores and the planned takeoff lane for craft and wave activity.
  • Announce intentions on the appropriate frequency and, if local practice supports it, ask nearby vessels to hold clear of the run.
  • Verify ELT function and consider a secondary locator device for passengers and the pilot.
  • Wear lifejackets during critical water work and brief passengers on emergency egress and the location of flotation and cutting tools.
  • Fly conservative rotation and climb profiles in marginal surface conditions and be prepared to abort early if the step is unstable.

The TSB final report will be authoritative and will likely include specific safety communications or recommendations. Until then, pilots, operators, and aerodrome managers should treat the Saint-Mathias occurrence as a call to sharpen water-specific risk controls. If you fly floats, go out and audit your local practices, your ELT installations, and your takeoff briefings. Small procedural improvements made now will reduce the odds that similar tragedies repeat themselves.