An assessment published by Defense News argues that severe damage to U.S. Naval Support Activity Bahrain could force a lasting change in how the Navy operates, supplies and maintains ships in the Middle East. The article says the base was attacked in Manama during the opening days of Operation Epic Fury and describes the installation as nearly destroyed and virtually uninhabitable.

The author, retired Navy Capt. John Cordle, estimates the damage at nearly $400 million. The buildings reportedly affected include the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters, a barracks, warehouses, communications towers and a potable-water station. Ships, including several U.S. Coast Guard vessels, appear to have been moved, while much of the staff and associated facilities were relocated, the article says. U.S. military sources cited in the piece said no one at the base was killed or severely injured.

The damage matters because NSA Bahrain is not solely an administrative headquarters. The installation hosts U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the Fifth Fleet, along with other tenant commands, and functions as a regional operating and support base. Cordle describes it as a hub for ships, aircraft, personnel and cargo moving through the region. In his assessment, the base has provided the physical foundation for maintaining an ongoing U.S. maritime presence in a strategically important theater.

The op-ed says the attack disrupted more than buildings and office space. It links the base’s degradation to reported shortages affecting the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, including parts, food, mail and other supplies. The loss of a familiar resupply point, Cordle writes, has extended supply lines from hundreds of miles to thousands of miles. That change could constrain forward-deployed maritime operations and complicate support for U.S. forces and regional coalition partners.

The article presents the logistical effects as a broader operational problem. NSA Bahrain supported the routine movement and sustainment of forces across the region, so damage to its facilities affects how ships are supplied and maintained even while Fifth Fleet continues functioning. Cordle argues that the United States must account for the loss of the installation’s pre-attack capacity when evaluating the Navy’s regional posture.

The op-ed also questions how the base was protected from Iranian ballistic missiles. Cordle argues that the United States failed to adequately defend a critical naval hub and says air-defense systems and missile-defense destroyers might have provided stronger protection. Those points are presented as his assessment in the opinion article. He also warns that reducing the U.S. military footprint in the region could further lengthen logistics routes and weaken support for ships and troops.

Vice Adm. Curt Renshaw, identified in the article as commander of Naval Forces Central Command, Fifth Fleet and the Combined Maritime Forces, told evacuees at a town hall that the situation had moved into “uncharted territory.” The article uses that remark to underscore continuing uncertainty over the base’s operational status and the future of the headquarters.

Cordle’s central conclusion is that the installation’s condition has strategic consequences beyond Bahrain. He writes that losing NSA Bahrain’s capabilities would be comparable to losing an aircraft carrier because the base enables a continuing naval presence, regional logistics and support for coalition partners. Fifth Fleet remains operational, the article says, but from infrastructure that has been badly degraded.

The op-ed calls for NSA Bahrain to be rebuilt to something close to its pre-attack capabilities, with enough security and support to make the installation viable again. Without that reconstruction, Cordle argues, the Navy’s regional logistics model and its ability to supply and maintain ships could be fundamentally altered.